Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

8-17-2013

Proposed Farm Bill Impact on Optimal Hedge Ratios for Crops
Trang Thu Tran

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Tran, Trang Thu, "Proposed Farm Bill Impact on Optimal Hedge Ratios for Crops" (2013). Theses and
Dissertations. 3663.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/3663

This Graduate Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

Automated Template B: Created by James Nail 2011V2.02

Proposed farm bill impact on optimal hedge ratios for crops

By
Trang Thu Tran

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Science
in Agricultural Economics
in the Department of Agricultural Economics
Mississippi State, Mississippi
August 2013

Copyright by
Trang Thu Tran
2013

Proposed farm bill impact on optimal hedge ratios for crops
By
Trang Thu Tran
Approved:
_________________________________
Keith H. Coble
Professor
Agricultural Economics
(Director of Thesis)

_________________________________
Barry J. Barnett
Professor and Graduate Coordinator
Agricultural Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Ardian Harri
Associate Professor
Agricultural Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
John Michael Riley
Assistant Extension Professor
Agricultural Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
George Hopper
Dean of College of Agricultural and
Life Sciences

Name: Trang Thu Tran
Date of Degree: August 17, 2013
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Agricultural Economics
Major Professor: Dr. Keith H. Coble
Title of Study:

Proposed farm bill impact on optimal hedge ratios for crops

Pages in Study: 103
Candidate for Degree of Master of Science
Revenue insurance with shallow loss protection for farmers has been introduced
recently. A common attribute of most shallow loss proposals is that they would be arearevenue triggered. The impact on optimal hedge ratios of combining these shallow loss
insurance proposals with deep loss farm-level insurance is examined. Since crop
insurance, commodity programs and forward pricing are commonly used concurrently to
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The world has changed a lot since the 2007 financial crisis. Economists consider
this crisis the worst financial crisis since the 1930s Great Depression. The US financial
crash, as a crucial part of the global financial system, resulted in global financial
depression. This depression abated consumer purchasing power and caused a decline in
production, making Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decrease.
A decrease in GDP has made a budget deficit, thus requiring a budget cut in
government sector. Agriculture is one of many fields that have incurred the consequence
of this ongoing budget deficit debate. Many agricultural economists have proposed
alternative insurance programs to cut the government cost of agricultural programs. The
goal of deficit reduction in agriculture is cutting federal spending in agricultural support
programs between 10 and 80 billion US dollars over 10 years (Congressional Research
Service, 2012). This decision forces government policy makers to adopt new insurance
designs different from the current insurance market so that the new ones can not only
efficiently protect farmers against the agricultural uncertainties but also ensure that the
new insurance market can stably operate in a reduced budget environment.
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Problem Statement
Typically, agricultural production is characterized as being inherently risky.
Disease, hail and drought are examples of uncertainties that negatively influence farm
yields. Moreover, output prices are stochastic variables beyond the control of individual
producers primarily due to these crops being homogenous commodities. Commodity
markets have few barriers to entry and no brand loyalty. Thus, farmers are price takers in
competitive markets with crop price uncertainty. For these reasons, constructing new
insurance programs to confront those risks has been widely researched.
Uncertainty in crop price and yield is a fundamental problem for agricultural
producers. Risk management tools, which help farmers manage crop price volatilities, are
available from the public sector and private markets. While privately - provided risk
managing products such as futures contracts have been shown to be effective instruments
that help farmers deal with price fluctuations, the public sector, in other words, the
government provides various risk reducing instruments. For example, individual yield
insurance products have been offered for decades. In 1996, individual revenue insurance
was introduced which added price risk protection to the federally-subsidized yield
insurance products. This created a controversy at that time about whether the new
revenue insurance designs were a substitute for futures and options contracts.
Traditionally, the support programs of the U.S Farm Bill for farmers can be
categorized into two groups: yield triggered or price support program. Typical examples
of yield triggered insurance programs are individual and area yield insurance. While yield
triggered insurance is based on yield shortfalls to measure the indemnity, income support
programs protect against price risk. Therefore, crop price is the random variable
2

determining payouts. The Federal price counter-cyclical payment (PCCP) is an example
of income support program. The federal crop insurance program can now be divided in
two groups: yield insurance and revenue insurance. Moreover, there are many types of
prevalent government commodity price or income support programs such as Average
Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) and Marketing loan benefits. In 2012, several area
revenue insurance programs have been proposed, but they are still under consideration by
the US Congress.
Ag Risk Coverage (ARC) and Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) are two
examples of area revenue insurance designs that have been proposed in legislation passed
by the U.S. Senate in 2012, but not yet adopted into law. These designs are both area
revenue-triggered shallow loss programs, which implies that when triggered the
indemnity function pays only for a thin layer of losses. These programs are designed to
work in conjunction with individual coverage crop insurance that indemnifies deeper
losses. Both ARC and STAX have many attributes of the Group Risk Plan (GRP) and
Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) insurance programs except that GRP and GRIP
are assumed to stand alone and cover both deep and shallow losses. If farm yield and
county yield are not perfectly correlated, farmers have to deal with the yield basis risk in
these products (Deng et al., 2007). Thus, the issue raised here is that the current
individual insurance and the proposed area revenue insurance may have different effects
on optimal hedge ratio. To my knowledge the effect of area-based insurance such as the
Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) on optimal hedge
ratios has not been addressed. This study examines those products and the effect of ARC
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and STAX on the optimal hedge ratios. Specifically, I evaluate the mutual interaction of
crop insurance, commodity programs and futures.
To understand the impact of new commodity programs on farmers’ welfare, a
computation of return from each insurance program is required. Implementing this
requires a detailed simulation of prices and yields as well as their correlation. A
simulation is used to identify the outcomes of prices and yields, which are employed to
evaluate the change of optimal hedging ratios from using only crop insurance and futures
to those associated with new area based revenue insurance programs supporting the
shallow loss coverage (ARC and STAX).
This study makes several contributions to the literature. It identifies the effect of
county triggered insurance as compared to individual triggered insurance on optimal
hedge ratios. In addition, the findings of the shallow loss protection insurance combined
with hedging point out that this insurance is a complement to the futures market. Another
contribution of this thesis is that it addresses the question of whether the U.S government
providing price risk protection supports or overlaps with the futures market. Thus, the
role of the U.S government in providing price risk protecting tools for farmers can be
evaluated more clearly.
Hedging is an efficient risk reducing tool that is widely adopted by investors in
the financial market. Hedging can protect investors from their potential loss as the price
movement goes against investors’ target profit during an investing cycle. A hedge ratio
means the ratio of the option or futures contract employed to the value of cash position
that can maintain the safety of the financial portfolio of investors. Similar to the hedge
ratio definition of the financial market, a hedge ratio for farmers measures the percentage
4

of expected production hedged. For example, a hedge ratio of 50 percent would imply
that the farmer hedged 50 percent of every bushel he expects to produce. The optimal
hedge ratio is the hedging percentage that maximizes producer expected utility. In this
study, I evaluate the mutual interaction of crop insurance, commodity program and
futures. Typically, farm program and crop insurance decisions are made well before
planting while hedging decisions can be made before harvest and can be revised during
the season. The welfare of farmers from using mixed risk management tools can be
compared using the measure of certainty equivalent.
Specific problem
The economic benefit that farmers receive from hedging is a core question related
to the viability of the private sector risk management market. Previous works have shown
that some revenue insurance programs are not efficient when they combine with hedging
in that the combination does not increase the welfare of producers (Coble, Heifner and
Zuniga (2000); Ubilava et al. (2011)). These papers considered only the effect of the
individual insurance, not the area based insurance such as GRP (Group Risk Plan) or
GRIP (Group Risk Income Protection). The disparity between individual insurance and
area insurance depends on the way these insurance programs are triggered. While farm
level based insurance uses farm yield as its base to calculate the indemnity, area based
insurance employs county yield to define the payment to insureds. Thus, the optimal
hedge ratio under individual insurance may be different with that under the combination
of area based insurance and futures contract. An analysis of area based revenue insurance
effect on optimal hedge ratio would add a comprehensive assessment on the government
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policy support programs for farmers. Moreover, the county yield insurance effect on the
optimal hedge ratios is examined as this insurance is combined with the futures contract.
Investigating the effect of area revenue insurance combined with hedging on the
optimal hedge ratios calls for a detailed simulation of prices and yields as well as their
correlation. From this simulation, outcomes of prices and yields are employed to evaluate
the change of optimal hedging ratio from using only crop insurance and futures to those
associated with new area based revenue insurance programs supporting the shallow loss
coverage (ARC and STAX). Each situation will be valued under alternative risk averse
preferences of farmers. The objectives of this thesis include:
1. Construct stochastic models of net return from using alternative risk
management instruments for representative farms in the U.S.
2. Analyze the effect of individual insurance programs on optimal hedge
ratio and producer welfare. Specifically, evaluate the individual insurance
programs, which are individual yield insurance and revenue insurance, and
area yield insurance in association with hedging via certainty equivalents
and optimal hedge ratios.
3. Analyze the effect of area yield insurance on optimal hedge ratios and
producer welfare.
4. Evaluate the effect of a mix of either individual or county based insurance
and ARC and STAX with hedging on optimal hedge ratio and producer
welfare.
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, this thesis shows
the effect of using futures and area yield or revenue insurance compared to hedging and
6

individual insurance on optimal hedge ratio which has not been addressed in the
literature. The hypothesis of this study conjecture the mixed effect of area based
insurance and futures will result in an optimal hedge ratio lower than with the
combination of futures and individual triggered insurance. This thesis also considers the
case of using a mix of area and individual insurance with futures and assesses its effect
on optimal hedge ratio. Generally, the effect of using futures with alternative instruments
including individual insurance, area insurance and a hybrid of farm yield based insurance
and area insurance on optimal hedge ratio will be evaluated, respectively. One important
thing in this study is that the proposed shallow loss programs will be evaluated in order to
see the effect of using this insurance with other deep loss insurance designs. Another
contribution of this thesis is that it addresses the question of whether the participation of
the U.S government in price risk protection supports or overlaps with the futures market.
Thus, the role of the U.S government in providing price risk protecting tools for farmers
can be evaluated more clearly.

7

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Agriculture is a field which inherently depends upon climate so that the
uncertainty of yield is inevitable. According to Miranda (1991), total yield risk of a given
producer can be decomposed into two parts: systematic risk that all producers in a given
planting area experience and idiosyncratic risk that depends on random events unique to
the individual farm. Temperature can be considered the systematic risk in a given county
for instance, while soil quality as the peculiar component being inherent to a given farm
will influence harvest time yield.
Optimal Hedge Ratios
There have been several related works on how the optimal hedge ratios of farmers
vary under the combined effect of futures, insurance and federal insurance program.
McKinnon (1967), as a pioneer researcher in investigating the effect of uncertainty on the
optimal hedge ratio, in his seminal paper found the “natural hedge” of yield variability.
He pointed out that the more negative the correlation between crop yield and crop price
is, the more benefit the producers will receive. As a result, the protection from “natural
hedge” would lower the optimal hedge ratios of producers because farmers can expect
higher price in a year of low yield.
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Lapan and Moschini (1995) constructed a combination of futures and option for
hedging when uncertainty of price, basis and production exists. They stated that because
farmers have to cope with many types of risks during a year of production, there should
be a combined risk reducing tool to manage these uncertainties. Under the assumption of
a joint normal distribution of futures price, cash price and yields, they proposed that
futures and options can be used at an exact combination of futures and an option
composition called a straddle. One important thing they discovered is the optimal hedge
ratio depends on the farmers’ attitude toward risk. Hence, the risk preferences determine
the shape of the utility function of farmers.
The growing literature on optimal hedge ratio under price change, basis and yield
risk with futures and insurance was addressed by Coble, Heifner and Zuniga (2000).
They contributed an understanding to the investigation of the positive effect of yield
insurance on optimal hedge ratio versus the negative effect of revenue insurance when
these risk management tools are used with hedging. In effect, yield insurance mitigates
the yield risk effect discussed by McKinnon. Yield insurance was shown to be
complement to the futures, but this effect is not the case for revenue insurance. The
authors used the combination of two types of insurance contracts with two forms of
forward pricing tools. The two kinds of insurance examined were yield triggered and
revenue triggered insurance. Forward pricing tools used were put options and futures.
Coble, Heifner and Zuniga (2000) found that Revenue Protection with harvest price
exclusion has negative effect on the optimal hedge ratio and lowers this ratio about 10
percent. The lowered optimal hedge ratio showed that the price protection from a hedge
is replaced by those revenue insurance products. The result is consistent even under the
9

change of the relative risk aversion coefficient (the risk preference of producers). Coble,
Heifner and Zuniga (2000) found that the certainty equivalent of farmers when revenue
insurance is used with hedging is smaller than that of farmers when there is no revenue
insurance. This result is an implication of the substitution effect of revenue insurance for
futures contracts. The reason behind this result can be explained by the mixed effect of
price and yield risk protection in revenue based insurance. The Revenue Assurance and
Income Protection, which is currently called Revenue Protection with Harvest Price
Exclusion, provides the yield and price risk protection, thus the price risk reduction can
be somewhat the same as the price reduction from hedging with futures. Therefore, the
optimal hedge ratio is decreased when a combination of futures and revenue insurance is
used.
Coble, Miller and Zuniga (2004) under the assumption of price change, basis and
yield investigate the mixed effect of using revenue insurance, loan program and futures
on the optimal hedge ratio. The results indicated that farmers have a lower optimal hedge
ratio when those three risk protection instruments are used compared to that ratio of
uninsured one. One advance made by the two studies of Coble, Heifner and Zuniga and
Coble, Miller and Zuniga is that they did not assume the normality distribution for yield,
price and basis risk as previous authors did. This approach makes more sense because
normality has been frequently rejected for crop yields (Harri et al., 2009).
Mahul (2003) also analyzed the effect of revenue insurance combined with
hedging on the optimal hedge ratio with results similar to that of Coble et al. (2000) and
Coble, Miller and Zuniga (2004). His numerical simulations showed that futures and
revenue insurance are substitutes, while yield insurance is a complement to futures.
10

Recently, Ubilava et al (2011) examined the effect of combining SURE program
(the Supplemental Revenue Assistance) with the participation of either PCCP program
(Federal price-based counter-cyclical payment) or ACRE program (revenue based
average crop revenue election). Their analysis concentrated on analyzing the producer
welfare from using SURE program; however, their basic idea is still the effect of mixed
using of futures, revenue insurance and other federal insurance program. The assumption
of lognormal distribution imposed on price and beta distribution imposed on yield was
employed. Their results indicated that the SURE program brings few benefits to farmers
so that the effect of this disaster support program has been exaggerated.
Price and yield distributions
Specification of a particular distributional form which is appropriate for price has
been a topic for various debates. Recent studies tend to prefer lognormal distribution as a
proper functional form for crop prices. Black, Scholes and Merton (1970) contributed to
literature a major turning point in the stock pricing by introducing the Black-Scholes
model which is widely known and applied in finance. They assumed that stock price is
lognormally distributed. In the simple concept, a variable is distributed lognormally when
its natural logarithm is distributed normally. The importance of the Black-Scholes model
is that it helps researchers specify two crucial moments which are mean and variance so
that the calculation of other higher moments are easier. Moreover, according to the
definition of lognormal distribution, stock price at a future time can be forecasted based
on just only the present stock price, mean and variance. In agricultural economics,
lognormal distribution has been accepted widely. As has already been stated, the previous
study of Lapan and Moschini (1995) assumed the normal distribution for crop price and
11

yield. Goodwin, Roberts and Coble (2000) investigated the appropriate distribution for
crop price under the consideration of time period change. This means maturity can be a
problem in which market conditions change will make the variances of price change
correspondingly. They mentioned that the price distribution can be a mixture of
distributions that have different variances, therefore, the normality distribution imposed
on price in previous studies is no longer compatible. After numerical experiments and
tests, the authors suggested the lognormal distribution imposed on crop price appears to
be more precise in calculating the premium rates, which are the money insureds need to
pay for the insurance company.
The literature on yield distributions is abundant and not consistent in its
conclusions. Basically, the yield distribution can be categorized into primary two
categories: parametric and nonparametric models. Each of these two groups of models
has its advantage. The parametric model, as its name implies, means that the data is
assumed to be generated from some particular family of probability density functions.
Thus, this method can give a specific functional form to researchers so that the
calculation is convenient. Otherwise, this can give a specific density imposed on a range
of data. However, this parametric approach also has disadvantages in that it relies upon
parametric family assumptions and the estimated parameters. Parametric models imposed
on yield distribution include the Gamma distribution (Gallagher, 1987), the conditional
beta distribution (Nelson and Preckel, 1989) or Johnson’s family distribution (Ramirez et
al., 2001). Nonparametric models were proposed by Goodwin and Ker (1998). This
approach is just the kernel density estimation method in that the model uses a
“bandwidth” or the “smoothing parameter” to fit the data. Goodwin and Ker (1998)
12

argued that the nonparametric method overpowers the parametric models in case the data
is finite so that the parametric approach hardly finds enough information to estimate the
parameters. Nevertheless, this method also has some inferior characteristics when
compared to the other. First, due to the use of “bandwidth”, the density plotted is
“oversmoothed”. Thus, the data outside the range would not be fitted precisely so that the
outlier effect would not be fully evaluated. Second, there is no density formula specified
so that it hinders researchers in calculating some statistical indices.
Normality was assumed in the many early studies of crop yields but recently other
non-Gaussian distributions have been used in trying to postulate the potential
distributional form for crop yields. Those studies above reject the non-normality but
presumed a variety of non-Gaussian distribution. Harri et al. (2009) tested the normality
assumption on a wide range of data collected across the U.S crops. Their result showed
that in the Corn Belt area, there is generally a rejection of the normality hypothesis.
Outside this area, other counties’ yields have distributions which are positively or
negatively skewed or non-normal. The normality testing for wheat yield in southern and
central plains region failed to reject the hypothesis of Gaussian distribution.
In simulation procedures, it is necessary to specify the inverse cumulative density
functions (cdf) for the marginal distributions in order to transform the correlated variables
from the uniform cdf into their corresponding distribution. Hence, the parametric method
is more conducive and flexible than nonparametric method. Empirical studies prove that
lognormal distribution is fitted best with prices. For yield distribution, the Beta
distribution can reasonably explain the data series because of its flexibility and
measurability of statistic orders. For the purpose of this research, this thesis employs
13

lognormal distribution to simulate crop prices and beta distribution to simulate crop
yields.
Trend estimation
“Behaviors” of data sometimes do not appear transparently because of the impact
of exogenous variables. While the crucial problem of crop price is autocorrelation,
volatility is the main thing in almost crop yield studies. In crop yields, this effect is
prevalent because the annual data are affected by numerous factors across years.
Technology and weather change over time would have a strong influence on crop yields.
The existence of technological change means that historical yield data must be converted
to a common level of technology. A common technique used to settle the correct
functional trend form for crop yields is to detrend yield data. Hafner (2003) proposed the
simple linear trend estimation in detrending crop yields. This method is straightforward
in that it uses the ordinary least square approach in calculating the residuals. The linear
trend estimation; therefore, implicitly infers that technological advance in crop yields is
consistent over time periods. This case may be not proper in practice, however. More
recently, Harri et al. (2011) employed the one and two knot spline models to detrend
yields. The knots are freely defined so that the trend of crop yields would be more
accurate. This technique is employed in this thesis.
Area insurance
Area insurance differs from individual insurance in that the area insurance uses
county yields to calculate the indemnity. Therefore, the effect of using the area insurance
may be different from that of farm yield based insurance. Deng, Barnett and Vedenov
14

(2007) investigated a tradeoff between using farm level insurance and area insurance
products. They found that when farm yield is not perfectly correlated with county yield,
the yield basis risk occurs. Thus, farmers have to choose between a higher basis risk (area
based product) and a higher cost (farm based product). Their results proposed area based
product (GRP) is appropriate for planting areas having homogenous production factors.
The result of their paper is consistent with the formulation of Miranda (1991) in that the
more farm yield is perfectly correlated with county yield, the more benefits farmers can
receive from using area insurance.
It is important to note that the papers addressing optimal hedging all assume the
individual insurance has no yield basis risk. Thus, the implication of hedging with area
yield or revenue products has not been examined in the literature. This thesis evaluates
the effect of using area yield and revenue insurance programs on the optimal hedge ratio
and how this effect responds to different risk preferences. This is done using the expected
utility model which von Neuman and Morganstern (1944) proposed to represent risk
preference in terms of utility. Thus, utility can be used to evaluate the level of benefits
that farmers have from using alternative risk protecting instruments corresponding to
different risk preferences. Otherwise, according to von Neuman and Morganstern,
expected utility is a function of the ending wealth. Net returns rising during crop year
from market, futures and alternative risk management tools were calculated in order to
define farmers’ ending wealth.
Simulation
Many sorts of simulation have been strongly developed to meet the demand of
research in various fields. Fundamentally, simulation is used to imitate the real process
15

over time periods so that it can give researchers a wider picture of the targeted
operation’s motivation process.
This study uses multi-variate simulation given the nature of the joint distribution
of crop price and yield. Unlike other risk managing instruments such as crop yield
insurance or income support program dealing with only one risk (yield risk or price risk),
revenue insurance management is more complicated in coping with variability of
revenue. Revenue is the product of yield and price, its variability consequently depends
on yield variability, price volatility and the interaction between price and yield. Empirical
analysis of yield and price data has not generally supported the normality distribution
imposed on crop yield (Harri et al., 2009). The normal distribution has the lower bound
of negative infinity so that if price or yield distribution is imposed to be normally
distributed there would be nonsensical negative values. Alternatively, empirical data
collecting from counties is not enough to plot the distribution of price and yield during
time periods; therefore, the use of simulation is the best tool to overcome this
shortcoming. Another reason to use simulation is the limited ability to obtain time series
farm level yield data.
There are several prevalent simulation methods widely applied in economic
researches that can be named, such as copula (Sklar, 1954) or Monte Carlo simulation.
The common idea in these simulations depends on the inversion method in which the
particular property of the cdf is used. For any given variables that follow the cdf, one may
take uniformly distributed draws from the 0-1 probability interval and use the inverse cdf
function to generate random draws from the given distribution. The characteristic of
uniform distribution in turn creates an advantage in solving the imitating process of real
16

world operation in that the uniform distribution is invariant during the translation process.
Thus, it preserves the nexus between variables needed to be simulated, which is the goal
of every simulation procedure.
The simulation procedure used in this thesis is the simulation of non-Gaussian
processes based on the fractile correlation of Phoon, Quek and Huang (PQH) described
by Anderson, Harri and Coble (2009). In their study, they compared the accuracy of the
Iman and Conover (IC) simulation with that of PQH simulation using PQH procedure.
This procedure permits users to simulate correlated random variables in the joint
distribution without restricting the basic form of marginal distributions. Hence, it is
particularly helpful to simulate variables that are not normally distributed. Similar to
other prevalent simulation procedures, the PQH simulation is also based on the inversion
method which is well-known in the simulation field.
Basically, the PQH simulation employs the idea of using Karhunen-Loeve (KL)
expansion in which eigen decomposition is used to simulate non Gaussian processes
based on the Gaussian translation. Eigen vectors and eigen values are components used
widely in image processing in which they can transform the multi-dimensional
information into the lower dimensional area so as to resolve images’ information easier.
Eigen decomposition essentially preserves the accuracy of the information of objectives
from the high-dimensional area to the low-dimensional area. Thus, this method is usually
used as dimension reduction in case the information of objective being resolved is
complicated. This idea is employed in PQH simulation.
A rank correlation matrix is calculated to ensure the likelihood of the nonlinear
relationship between variables (if existing) can be captured. The probability associated
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with correlated standard normals can be used to transform correlated variables into the
desired marginal distributions of the joint distribution with the correlation between
variables accurately approximated to the ones in the rank correlation matrix used from
the beginning step before the translation progress. The accuracy of retaining correlation
of the rank correlation matrix in the non-Gaussian marginal distributions is maintained
because PQH simulation uses the uniform distribution when transforming to nonGaussian marginal distributions from the process based on Gaussian distribution. In other
words, the PQH procedure is just a monotonic transformation.
It is worth noting that the PQH simulation is straightforward to program and does
not manipulate the correlation matrix (Anderson, Harri and Coble 2009); therefore, the
reproduction of the correlation of dependent variables from non-Gaussian multivariate
distribution is highly accurate. The application of PQH procedure can be expanded to any
other correlated stochastic variables from multivariate distribution. In the scope of this
research, the PQH procedure is employed to compute the correlated yields, futures price
changes, basis and other price variables.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis employs the expected utility model to assess the change in optimal
hedge ratio from using alternative risk protecting instruments. Despite the constraint of
depending on its axioms, the expected utility model has been widely used in studies
toward uncertainty and individuals’ behaviors under risk.
Expected utility model
The study of decision making under risk or uncertainty was first introduced by
Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713, and then further examined by his brother Daniel Bernoulli in
1738 in the famous “Saint Petersburg Paradox.” He explained the Paradox by using the
fair game, in which the probability of winning X dollars is the same as the probability of
losing X dollars. Thus, as a consequence, the expected value of a fair game always sums
to zero. When the money required to initiate the fair game is relatively small, people are
willing to play. However, when that initial purchase is increased to an unacceptably high
value, people no longer want to play the fair game, although the potential to earn money
in the second situation is much larger than it is in the first situation. From this result,
Daniel Bernoulli argued that to assess the value of an item, its price will not fully explain
its value. Instead, the value of an item should be evaluated by the utility it yields to
individuals. Thus, he introduced a new concept to explain the decision process of
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individuals by using the expected utility model. The first utility model Daniel Bernoulli
used was the logarithmic utility function.
First of all, the nexus of an individual’s behavior and his or her uncertainty is the
center of the expected utility model. This approach depends on the existence of risk,
seeing it as an important component in decision making; in other words, a decision made
under risk is the focus of the model. Due to the presence of uncertainty, there always
exists more than one prospect associated with each decision. In particular, for each
outcome, a utility exists so that the expected utility can be calculated. Mansfield (1994)
stated that utility associated with a specific outcome shows the preference of an
individual for that given outcome. Thus, to compare which outcome is preferred by an
individual, the level of utility can be employed.
As stated above, decision making under risk plays a central role in the expected
utility model. The uncertainty component in this model is represented by the probability.
Thus, with the presence of uncertainty, the utility under a given outcome multiplied by its
probability will be the expected utility of that outcome. To make it possible to compute
the expected utility of a decision, the expected utility assumption, “linear in
probabilities,” is used. This concept also belongs to one of the expected utility model’s
assumptions and its drawbacks as well. Due to the linearity in probabilities, the expected
utility then can be calculated as simply the sum of products of probabilities and utilities
for each outcome. Thus, in sum, the expected utility model comprises of rational
individuals choosing uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility.
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Drawbacks of expected utility
Although the expected utility model has been persistently used in experimental
economics, its application in practice is still in debate. The cons of using expected utility
is that this theory depends on the so-called axioms of choices and preferences:
completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence. Thus, only when the decision
makers comply with these assumptions, their preferences can be presented by expected
utility and the functional form of their utility can be defined. These axioms are a
weakness of expected utility theory according to some researchers. In practice, several
studies indicate the violation of these behavioral assumptions, for instance a famous
Allais Paradox (Machina, 1982). Machina argued that due to the “linearity in
probabilities,” the preference to a specific outcome is “oversmoothed” that is not real in
practice. The expected utility theory often assigns a specific utility function to individuals
so that the effect of “oversmoothing” is unavoidable.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal article provided the prospect
theory that modifies the expected utility theory. They argued that in practice, people
usually underweight the probable outcome while overweight the certain outcome, which
is known as “certainty effect”. Otherwise, people also omit the component that affects all
prospects under consideration which is known as “isolation effect”. Hence, unlike other
studies which objected to expected utility theory focusing on finding a specific functional
form for utility, Kahneman and Tversky essentially concentrated on the consistency of
individuals’ preference in various situations. With these two effects discovered, these
authors proved that the preference of individuals will no longer be consistent for the same
item when that item is presented under different ways, in other words, there exists
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different utility functions over losses and gains. Kahneman and Tversky concluded that
people usually take more risk as they deal with loss and are more risk averse if the
gamble is couched in terms of monetary gains.
Von Neuman-Morganstern expected utility and risk aversion
The general theme of this thesis is based on observing the changing of benefits of
farmers from using alternative combinations of risk management tools. Due to the
existence of stochastic price and yield in the returns of producers, von NeumanMorganstern expected utility was employed. According to the theory of von NeumanMorganstern (1947), a farmer will make a rational choice by maximizing his expected
utility. From the result of fair game, von Neuman and Morganstern recognized that,
individuals do not value items evenly. In the world of bounded information and
irrationality, there would be no surprise to see the risk preference is different among
individuals; hence, due to the risk preference disparity, the risk aversion concept was
built in particular to explain the decision making of individuals. Given two possible
outcomes that yield the same expected value but their uncertainties, or probabilities, are
different - if an individual chose the outcome which is more certain, he would be
considered risk averse. That is explained by the reason the individual chooses the more
certain outcome because he maximizes his expected utility. Similar to this explanation, if
the individual chooses the riskier outcome, his risk preference tends to risk loving. The
individual who is in between risk averse and risk loving is normally described as being
risk neutral. In this case, the individual is indifferent with the two possible outcomes, or
in other words, his decision is not influenced by risk. In this case, the individual is
indifferent with the two possible outcomes, or in other words, his decision is not
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influenced by risk. The importance of determining risk aversion cannot be denied in
insurance. Figures 3.1 to 3.3 describe the expected utility function with differentiated risk
preferences.
In figure 3.1, the utility function shown is for a risk averse individual. Thus, the
shape of the expected utility function is concave. This utility function also follows the
law of diminishing marginal utility of income in that the additional increase in utility is
smaller when the income increases. The fair game would be an ideal example to illustrate
these figures. Risk averters are in favor of more certain outcome, thus they are willing to
pay a given amount of money to avoid taking on the risk in the fair game. Given the
initial wealth is W, the participants in the fair game have to pay an amount of money m if
they lose, otherwise they will get the same amount of money. The difference between the
certainty equivalent and the expected value which is called risk premium would be the
willingness to pay of risk averse individuals to avoid taking participating in the fair game.
Stated differently, these individuals are willing to accept a smaller amount of money,
which is equal to the certainty equivalent, than the expected value to avoid taking on the
risk in the fair game.
In figure 3.2, individuals are risk neutral; thus, they do not care about the potential
uncertainty for their decision. In this case, the concept of alternative possible prospects
that can happen due to the uncertainty does not exist. Thus, their utility function is a
straight line, or in other words, the relationship between utility and money invested is
linear. For an additional one dollar increase in income, the utility will increase exactly
one unit. The certainty equivalent and the expected value is the same for this case
because utility function is linear.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the utility function of risk lovers. Contrary to risk averse
individuals, these people love uncertainty so that they would have to be paid not to take
on the risk. The utility functional form is convex and its slope is getting steeper along the
curve. This type of individual is not a potential purchaser of insurance.

Figure 3.1

Utility function of Risk averters

Figure 3.2

Utility function of Risk Neutral Individuals
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Figure 3.3

Utility function of Risk Lovers

Certainty Equivalent
The expected utility model imposes a general utility function on individuals so
that their preferences can be explicitly presented by utility. For two possible uncertain
prospects, however, it is hard to define which one has larger utility. This problem is
explained in that utility measures are meaningless other than as ordinal ranking. Certainty
equivalent transform these rankings into dollars, which is more meaningful to individuals
and researchers.
In the formal definition, certainty equivalent is the amount of income that will
make the individual indifferent with or without holding the risky asset (von Neuman and
Morganstern, 1947). Analyzing the decision process of individuals by using certainty
equivalent has some advantages. As has been noted in the definition, certainty equivalent
is a specific amount of money that yields the expected utility to individuals as much as
the expected value does. Thus, money is the tangible value that makes individuals easily
understood so that they can compare alternative uncertain prospects more comfortably.
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Moreover, due to the using of certainty equivalent as the quantified value, any two
possible prospects can be compared quantitatively. Therefore, this index is a good
measure of comparing the usefulness of alternative risk management tools.
Constant risk aversion coefficient
Risk preference of decision makers plays an important role in the study of
individuals’ behavior under uncertainty. Pratt (1964) stated that risk aversion coefficient
is the parameter that decides the level of risk aversion of risk averters. Thus, determining
the risk aversion coefficient relates to the curvature of the utility function. The more
curved the utility function is implies that the risk aversion is higher; therefore, the
functional form of risk averse individuals’ utility can help researchers determine the level
of risk aversion of those people. However, curvature of utility function that reflects risk
aversion is not easy to measure. As Hardarker et al. (1997) stated, the utility function is
not uniquely derived unless it is defined by a positive linear transformation. Hence, utility
function is needed to be invariant in that transformation.
Both absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion can measure the risk
preference of an individual. Constant relative risk aversion is employed in this thesis
because it measures the risk preference as individual’s wealth varies.
The thesis uses several assumptions. First, the representative farms studied have
1,000 acres and initial wealth for farmer of 1.6 million US dollars. Margin interest for the
futures contract is assumed to be zero. The final assumption is that farmers sell the
futures contract at the beginning of the year and buy it back at the end of the year. This
thesis studies the case when the risk aversion coefficient of the decision maker is
invariant with respect to the change in wealth. That is, when the wealth of an individual
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increases or decreases, his risk preference would not change. Thus, certainty equivalent
can be derived from constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. It is
reasonable to specify that the utility of a producer is a function of his ending wealth. In
the scope of this thesis, the CRRA utility function is employed. CRRA utility function for
each farmer is given by the canonical formula following:

(3.1)
where U is the utility of a farmer, W is stochastic end of season wealth of a farmer and r
is the coefficient of this CRRA utility function.
The thesis’s goal is to observe the action of farmers that buy risk protection
instruments. Thus, the formula of the expected utility complies with the law of
diminishing marginal utility so as to limit the thesis in studying only the risk averse
individuals.
The ending wealth of the farmer is stochastic. Once the expected utility is defined,
certainty equivalent can be calculated by the following formula:

(3.2)
where CE is certainty equivalent, E (U ) is expected utility calculated from CRRA utility
function, other variables are as previously defined. Expected utility can be defined as
follows:
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(3.3)
where π is the probability of outcome i occurring.
According to Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997), the certainty equivalent for
a given outcome can be used to define the preferred outcome. Hence, the optimal hedge
ratio is the one that yields the highest certainty equivalent for farmers (Ubilava et
al.,2011).
The crucial purpose of this study is to analyze how risk transfer associated with
different commodity programs and crop insurance influence the optimal hedging ratio of
farmers. Thereby, defining net return flow from each risk management tool is needed to
compute the ending wealth of producers. Net return can be divided into two main parts:
market return and net return from risk managing instruments. For futures, net return will
be the difference between gross return from futures at the settlement price of the futures
contract and the commission/transaction cost. For commodity program or crop insurance,
the net return might be indemnity minus premium that farmers have to pay if they want to
transfer their crop risk to insurers.
The modeling specification of crop insurance, commodity program and hedging
used will be similar to that of Coble, Heifner and Zuniga (2000) to construct elements of
ending wealth in this paper.
Ending wealth of a producer in a given season is equal to the beginning season
wealth added to the net return over farmer’s acres during a year. Ending wealth was
calculated for 1,000 acres. According to Coble, Heifner and Zuniga (2000):

(3.4)
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where W1 is the end of season wealth, W0 is the beginning of season wealth, NI are net
returns per acre obtained from realized income of the crops and from alternative risk
management tools used at the beginning of his planting.
Net returns NI calculated based on 1,000 acres from both market and alternative
risk management tools; thus, NI is calculated as the sum of the following net realized
returns. First, net realized income from planting crops of a farmer is:

(3.5)
where NI m is net income per acre from selling crops in market m, p1 is harvest time
stochastic cash price at the end of year, y1 is harvest time stochastic yield, C is the per
acre cost which is assumed to be non-stochastic and thus known at planting.
Net return from crop insurance comes from three types of crop insurance
products: Actual Production History (APH), Revenue Protection with harvest price
exclusion (RPPE), Revenue Protection (RP) and Group Risk Plan (GRP). APH is an
individual yield insurance with yield shortfalls indemnified based on harvest time futures
prices at planting time. The formula for net return of APH can be computed as:

(3.6)
where NI APH is net return per acre from using APH insurance, CL is level percentage of
yield coverage, y0 is expected yield at the planting time which is assumed to be known,

f0 is the expected harvest time futures price at the beginning time period and RAPH is the
premium determined at sign up.
29

RPPE is based on the Revenue Protection policy and is a simple revenue
guarantee based on planting time price expectations. Thus, this insurance protection
policy does not count the upside effect of price in case harvest time futures price is larger
than the beginning futures price. The formula for net return of RPPE can be written as:

(3.7)
where NI RPPE is the net returns per acre from using RPPE insurance, f1 is the harvest
time futures price, RRPPE is premium determined at sign up.
RP is a second revenue insurance product. The loss at harvest time will choose the
higher price between the harvest time futures price or planting time futures price. The net
return formula may be written as:

(3.8)
where NI RP is the net returns per acre from using RP insurance, RRP is premium paid at
sign up, other variables are as previously defined.
The farmer receives value of futures contract when the harvest time futures price
is less than planting time futures price at sell. To make the calculation of net returns from
futures simpler, the interests of margin deposits including initial margin deposit and
margin maintenance are assumed to be zero. While initial margin deposit is required to
cover the potential loss based on historical information of futures contract, margin
maintenance is the required additional money to bring the margin rate to the initial
margin ratio.
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Futures contract is assumed to be purchased in continuous units and transaction
cost for a futures contract is $0.06 per acre. The net return from hedging by futures can
be calculated as:

(3.9)
where h is hedging ratio computed as percentage of expected yield at sign up, R f is the
transaction cost.
GRP is the only area yield insurance examined in this study. Unlike APH, GRP
uses county yield in place of individual farm yield to calculate its trigger and indemnity
for farmers. Thus, it has the yield basis risk. The formula for the insurance can be
calculated as:

(3.10)
where y0 c and y1c are respectively the expected county yield at the planting and realized
harvest yield , RGRP is the premium determined at sign up.
Note that the formula (10) is used to make it consistent with other insurance’s
formulas. In reality, GRP is calculated as follows:

(3.11)
APH, RP, RPPE and GRP are the current insurance programs that cover the deep
loss for producers. Thus, while current insurance often offers risk protection products that
help farmers deal with deep losses, shallow loss is still a real loss that producers have to
incur every crop year but is not covered in deep loss cover insurance. This thesis
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evaluates two area based revenue insurance programs that support farmers in covering the
shallow loss but they are still under consideration of the US Congress. The first program
is Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC). Basically, this area based revenue provides both
farm yield level trigger and county yield level trigger. Thus, ARC will be either
individual based or area based revenue insurance. ARC constructs formulas of indemnity
for both types of ARC insurance. For both farm and county levels, the indemnity will be
no greater than 10 percent of the benchmark revenue. The revenue guarantee, which is
used as a trigger, is 89 percent of average benchmark revenue for both cases. ARC for
both farm and county level does not require premium paid because this area insurance is
a free government program.
For farm level: the benchmark revenue will be the product of the five year
Olympic average of individual yields and the higher price between a five year average of
the national marketing year average price (MYA) for a given crop and the marketing loan
rate. The formula for benchmark revenue can be written as:

(3.12)
where REVBi is the benchmark revenue per acre at farm level i, yOA is the five year
Olympic average of farm yields, f MYA is MYA price for a given crop insured, floan is the
marketing loan rate.
The farm level ARC revenue guarantee is 89% of per acre benchmark revenue.
Thus, its formula may be written as:
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(3.13)
where REVGi is revenue guarantee per acre for farm level i.
The ARC at farm yield level will be triggered when the revenue of individual
farm at harvest time is less than the farm level ARC revenue guarantee. However, per
acre payment is not allowed to be larger than 10% of per acre farm level benchmark
revenue and is only paid on 60% of the planted acres. Net return per acre from the farm
level ARC is calculated as:

NI ARCi   0.6Max(0.1REVBi , REVGi  REVi )

(3.14)

where  is dummy variable which is 1 if farm revenue is smaller than revenue guarantee
and 0 otherwise, REVi is the farm revenue at harvest time which is the harvest time yield
multiplied with the higher price of marketing loan rate or the “midseason price”- the
Olympic average of the national marketing year average for the first five months of the
year (MYA5). The formula of farm yield will be written as:

REVi  y1Max( f MYA5 , floan )

(3.15)

where REVi is the farm level i revenue per acre at harvest time, f MYA5 is the “midseason
price”.
For county level: the benchmark revenue at this level is calculated similar to that
of farm level but it is based on the five year Olympic average of county yields.

REVBc  yOAc Max( f MYA , floan )
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(

(3.16)

(3.14

where REVBc is the per acre ARC benchmark revenue at county level c, others are as
previously defined.
The per acre county level ARC revenue guarantee is counted for 89% of the
benchmark revenue:

REVGc  0.89REVBc

(3.17)

where REVGc is the county level ARC revenue guarantee.
The ARC at county yield level will be triggered when the county revenue at
harvest time is less than the county level ARC revenue guarantee. However, the payment
of county level ARC is not larger than 10 percent of the county level benchmark revenue
and is paid on 75 percent of the planted acres. Per acre net return from the county level
ARC is calculated as:

NI ARCc   0.75Max(0.1REVBc , REVGc  REVc )

(3.18)

where  is dummy variable which is 1 if county revenue is smaller than revenue
guarantee and 0 otherwise, REVc is the per acre county revenue at harvest time which is
the product of average county yield and the higher of marketing loan rate or the
“midseason price”. The per acre county revenue can be calculated as:

REVc  y1c Max( f MYA5 , floan )

(3.19)

where REVc is the ending time county revenue per acre, y1c is the harvest time county
yield, other variables are previously defined.
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Stack Income Protection Plan (STAX) is an insurance program designed to
provide the revenue shallow loss protection and a complement to crop insurance
purchasing of farmers. As proposed it would only be available for cotton producers,
STAX does not require farmers to buy a specific crop insurance product as a condition to
be eligible for STAX. STAX is a modified program from the Risk Management Agency
(RMA) crop insurance program Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP). STAX sets a
reference price, which is the higher price between futures prices at sign up time and
harvest time, to calculate the STAX revenue benchmark. This price protection builds a
shield for farmers in case the crop price increases during the planting time period. The
STAX guarantee revenue can be written:
GuaranteeSTAX  0.90 *CYOA * max  f 0 , f1 

(3.20)

where CYOA is expected county yield calculated as Olympic average of county yields
over the past five years.
The STAX income protection insurance trigger depends on county experience,
which is area based yield. The STAX will be triggered if realized county revenue is less
than STAX guarantee revenue. The net return from STAX can be written as:
NI STAX  min  0.2GuaranteeSTAX , max(0,GuaranteeSTAX  CY  f1 )   RSTAX (3.21)

where CY is realized county yield, RSTAX is premium paid at sign up time, other variables
are as previously defined.
STAX will protect producers from revenue shallow losses from 10 percent to 30
percent of expected farm revenue.
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The ending wealth is derived from the beginning wealth which is assumed to be
known and the net returns from equations (3.1) to (3.10). The objective function will be
maximizing expected utility by choosing the optimal hedge ratio.

(3.22)
where h is the optimal hedge ratio, NIi is the net returns from the deep loss insurance
program i , which is APH, RP, RPPE or GRP and NI a is area revenue insurance a, which
is either ARC or STAX. Optimal hedge ratio is evaluated for each situation of futures
combing with individual insurance, area insurance and a mix of both individual and area
insurance, respectively.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND MODELING

Yields required for calculating the cash flows from equation (1) to (10) include
farm yields and county yields. Simulated county yields will be employed to compute the
average county yield in the formula of county revenue.
Data, yield trend and price changes
Monthly data from 1980 to 2012 were used to calculate futures price changes,
basis and yields. These data was obtained from the U.S Department of Agriculture’s
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) and Commodity Research Bureau
(CRB) database. Three counties that are chosen to evaluate include: McLean in Illinois
with soybean and corn crops, Sheridan in Kansas with corn and wheat crops and Yazoo
in Mississippi with soybean and cotton crops.
Technological change would have strong influence on crop yields and thus need
to be removed to obtain detrended yields. The method used in this thesis is the spline
model used in Harri et al. (2011). County yields are detrended to obtain the forecasted
yields that are used in estimating farm yields. One knot and two knot spline models are
used for choosing the best fitted trend for each selected location.
Numerous price variables are needed including harvest time futures price f1 ,
ending time period cash price p1 , five year olympic average price fMYA , five month
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olympic average price f MYA5 and marketing loan rate floan . Because the five month
olympic average price is almost equal to the five year olympic average price, the study
used only five year olympic average price in calculating the net return NI. Futures price
changes and harvest time basis values are required to compute f1, p1 (Coble, Heifner and
Zuniga, 2000).
Given the nature of hedging with futures, the income from futures trading does
not necessarily increase the expected returns to farmers but make the cash plus futures
outcome more certain. As spot price changes of the commodity hedged are not equal to
the price changes of the underlying futures contracts, hedgers incur the basis risk. The
basis is defined as the difference between the spot price of commodity to be hedged and
the futures price of the underlying commodity (Hull, 2000).
Farm yields
Farm yields, which are derived from detrended county yields, follow the
formulation of Miranda (1991). The formula of Miranda was described by Coble and
Barnett (2007) as follows:
FYt   FY   (CYt  CY )   FY ,t

(4.1)

where:
-

FYt , CYt are respectively stochastic farm yield and county yield at period t

-

FY , CY are respectively expected value of farm yield and county yield

-

 is a coefficient measuring the responsiveness of farm yield to the systematic
factors affecting county yield.
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-

 FY ,t is farm yield deviation that is uncorrelated with county yield.
 FY ,t is assumed to be normally distributed N (0,  F2 ) . Miranda (1991)

decomposed farm yield deviation from the expected value into systemic risk

 (CYt  CY ) and unsystematic risk  FY ,t with zero mean and standard deviation  F .
The sensitivity coefficient  is the sum of weighted average by acreage of all beta’s in a
given county (Miranda 1991). For the purpose of this thesis,  is assumed to be 1 as it is
used in the grid search of Coble and Barnett (2007).
According to Coble and Barnett (2007), a grid search can be employed to estimate
farm yield by inserting equation (4.1) into the equation (4.2):

Min | PR65  ELC F |

(4.2)

 Pg (0.65 FY  FYt F ) 
ELC F  E 

Pg 0.65 FY



(4.3)

where

where PR65 is 65% coverage level base premium that crop yield insurance purchasers are
charged in each county, ELCk is the expected loss cost at k standard deviation given Pg ,
which is price guarantee, and FYt F is realized farm yield given a selected  F at period
t.
Given a coverage level of 65 percent, the expected loss cost is derived assuming

 F values ranging from one to ten times  c with intervals of 0.1, where  c is the
standard deviation of a county-level yield for a given crop and location. A hundred of
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random draws  F are combined with each county yield deviation to generate a farm yield
FYt . The  F selected that minimizes the absolute difference between the simulated
expected loss cost and the actual RMA rate (equation 4.2) is chosen to calculate the farm
yield deviation  FY ,t . Selected farm yield FYt is also the farm yield which has the  F
minimizing the difference of equation 4.2.
Phoon, Quek and Huang simulation
Multivariate joint distribution is used to describe all the possibilities of mutual
influences of crop prices and yields. The Phoon, Quek and Huang (PQH) simulation
procedure is employed to simulate five variables including futures price changes, basis,

fMYA , county yields and farm yields. PQH procedure is a non-Gaussian transformation
process based on a Gaussian process. Therefore, the correlation among simulated
variables would be the same to that of variables before the transformation. According to
Anderson, Harri and Coble (2009), this simulation basically includes these following
steps:
1. Rank correlation matrix, S , has to be created from futures price changes, basis,
MYA price, marketing loan rate and yields (farm yields and county yields).
2. Calculate Pearson correlation (product/moment correlation) using rank correlation


matrix S and the formula:   2sin[ S]
6
3. Perform eigen decomposition on Pearson correlation matrix to derive eigen value

k and eigen vector f k ( x) , where k are random correlated variables in the
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previous rank correlation matrix and x is the element of eigen vector. The
minimum eigen value k has to be nonnegative.
4. In Karhunen-Loeve (KL) expansion, use a randomly independent standard normal
vector, k ( ) , combine with eigen factors to obtain correlated standard normal

k :  k   k  k ( ) f k (x)
k

where  is element of standard normal distribution k
5. Convert the correlated standard normals into a uniform cdf. This conversion
maintains the correlation between variables in rank correlation matrix because of
the properties of the zero mean and unit variance distribution.
6. Define probability associated with each uniform correlated standard normal.
These probabilities will be used to transform the variables being simulated to the
desired marginal distributions.
Simulated outcome was used to calculate stochastic variables, which include
futures price changes, basis, MYA price, farm yields and county yields, in order to
calculate net returns. The simulation was designed for changes in insurance coverage
level together with risk aversion coefficient of farmers to allow evaluating the ARC and
STAX effect on optimal hedge ratio under alternative scenarios.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
The descriptive statistics of data outcome from the PQH simulation are presented
in Table 5.1. Representative counties clearly have regional differences. Table 5.1 also
shows that for the same crop but in different counties, farm level yields apparently differ
from one another.
Table 5.1 reports the statistics of data, including standard deviation, mean and
coefficient of variation (CV). Standard deviation can be a good candidate to describe how
the data points scatter in a given pdf, however, standard deviations of two different
probability densities cannot be comparable. Thus, this study uses CV to make the crops’
deviations of two different pdf comparable. Cotton has the highest CV for futures prices
and therefore it has the widest dispersion among other counties’ crops implying cotton
price has the highest relative risk. The lowest CV of futures prices is with wheat.
Yazoo county was chosen as a representative risky county with high yield
variability. The variation of county yields in Yazoo tends to be larger than that of other
county yields in other regions. The different deviations in county yields among regions
permit us to compare the effect of area insurance on the different counties which have
different levels of yield uncertainty. McLean county is in the lowest risk region among
representative counties, thus having the lowest deviations in crop yields. Illinois is known
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as one of the most productive regions for producing corn and soybean in the US. The
homogeneity of production inputs such as soil and rainfall in this county make a good
condition for growing crops. Hence, farm yields and farm revenues from both corn and
soybean have no noticeable difference in CV. In each region, the county yield has a lower
CV than that of the farm yield. As a result, the CV of the county revenue is also lower
than that of the farm revenue. Risky areas, including Yazoo and Sheridan counties, have
the higher revenue variability in than McLean county, which is less risky than the other
two counties.
In general, there is no big difference in CV of futures price changes in crops. The
highest CV of futures price changes is with cotton while the lowest CV of futures price
changes is with wheat. Basis is the important thing that farmers want to know as they
invest in futures contract because basis decides their optimal hedge ratio. In Table 5.1,
the largest CV of basis is with cotton and wheat so that these crops have higher basis risk
compared to other crops. CV of basis for corn and soybean is around one, which is much
lower than that of cotton and wheat. Therefore, the optimal hedge ratios would be
expected to be higher in corn and soybean compared to the optimal hedge ratios in cotton
and wheat.
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Table 5.1

Descriptive Statistics
McLean, McLean,
IL
IL
Corn
Soybean

Parameter
Futures
price

Futures
price
changes

Basis

Farm
Yield

Farm
Revenue

County
yield

County
Revenue

Counties
Yazoo, Yazoo,
MS
MS
Cotton Soybean

Sheridan,
KS
Wheat

Std.Dev
Mean
CV

1.375
7.14
0.19

2.69
15.01
0.18

0.148
0.716
0.21

2.69
15.01
0.18

1.42
8.35
0.17

Std.Dev
Mean
CV
Std.Dev
Mean
CV

0.18
0.955
0.19
0.18
0.17
1.05

0.18
0.99
0.18
0.21
0.13
1.62

0.20
0.998
0.20
0.44
0.09
4.89

0.18
0.99
0.18
0.21
0.13
1.62

0.17
0.982
0.17
0.61
0.09
6.51

Std.Dev
Mean
CV

44.76
190.48
0.23

13.43
55
0.24

419
1060
0.40

21.92
51.96
0.42

14.4
42.6
0.34

Std.Dev
Mean
CV

379.35
1366
0.28

207.33
818.38
0.25

807.45
1418.5
0.57

296.01
683.86
0.43

269.35
380.88
0.71

Std.Dev
Mean
CV

22.18
184.87
0.12

9.58
55.6
0.17

190.35
1031.8
0.18

10.74
44.14
0.24

10.53
40.15
0.26

Std.Dev
Mean
CV

167.54
1314.6
0.13

154.89
833.9
0.19

206.88
750.48
0.28

138.78
662
0.21

88.15
332.35
0.27

The PQH simulation requires a Spearman correlation matrix as the input of the
simulation process. Spearman correlation matrices from representative regions’ crops are

44

calculated from the underlying price and yield data from 1980-2012. The results are
reported in Tables 5.2 to Table 5.6 that represents the matrix for each crop, respectively.
Table 5.2 shows the correlation relationship among variables in McLean Corn. As
have been shown in this table, there are negative linear correlations among these
variables, which are futures price change and basis, futures price change and farm yield,
futures price change and county yield, basis and county yield, MYA price and farm yield
and MYA price and county yield. These results were also found for other crops, thus the
findings are consistent across planting areas.
Moreover, the basis, which is the difference between the cash price and the
futures price, is minimal compared to the price risk that the farmers have to cope with.
Therefore, the yield variability and the correlation between farm yields and crop prices
play a significant role in defining regional differences. What should be focused on in
these findings is that the relationship between MYA and farm yield and the correlation of
farm yield with county yield as well. The more negatively correlated the relationship of
farm yield and crop price is, the higher benefits the producers would have from area
triggered programs in practice (Miranda, 1991). This thesis found the consistent negative
correlation between farm yield and crop price in every representative crop; however, each
had different levels of magnitude. McLean corn and soybean have the highest
correlations in terms of absolute value between the MYA price and farm yield. Hence,
the negative price yield correlation in McLean reduces the revenue risk in that region.
Other regions are considered riskier than Illinois, and generally have the smaller absolute
value of correlation for farm yield and MYA price.
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The correlation of farm yield and county yield plays an important role in deciding
which kind of insurance the farmers should choose to protect against their potential crop
risk. Deng et al. (2007) proved that the imperfect correlation of farm yield and county
yield is the cause that creates the yield basis risk. The county yield insurance is most
beneficial to farmers only when the farm yield and county yield has the perfect positive
correlation. However, exogenous elements such as weather make it impossible to have
that perfect correlation in practice. The area yield insurance has a lower cost than the
individual yield insurance does so that the farmers can choose which kind of insurance
depending on the relationship of their farm yield with the overall county yield in the same
crop year. From Table 5.2 to Table 5.6 one can see the correlation of farm yields and
county yields across different crops. Corn and soybean crops in McLean county were
reported to have the highest positive correlation between county and farm yields while
Yazoo county has the lowest positive correlation. The correlations of farm yield and
county yield in McLean for corn and soybean are 0.682 and 0.620, respectively. In
Yazoo, the correlations significantly drop to 0.294 and 0.240 in cotton and soybean,
respectively. Spatial homogeneity of production in each county significantly affects the
correlation here. The difference in correlation between farm yield and county yield can be
explained by the fact that McLean county has the better soils and the good weather
condition than other areas, thus reducing the magnitude that the farm yield deviates from
the county yield. On the other hand, farmers in Yazoo county have to cope with a higher
yield basis risk than those in other representative counties.
This study uses simulation in order to generate random variables, which include
futures price changes, basis, MYA, farm yields and county yields, so that those variables
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would be used to compute the net returns from alternative insurance programs. The
number of observations for the simulation is 100,000.
Table 5.2

Correlation matrix for McLean Corn

Futures price change
Basis
MYA
Farm yield
County yield

Table 5.3

MYA
0.546
0.259
1

Farm
yield
-0.533
0.371
-0.288
1

County
yield
-0.611
-0.541
-0.242
0.682
1

Farm
yield
-0.592
0.325
-0.123
1

County
yield
-0.593
-0.247
-0.252
0.620
1

Correlation matrix for McLean Soybean

Futures price change
Basis
MYA
Farm yield
County yield

Table 5.4

Futures price
change
Basis
1
-0.366
1

Futures price
change
Basis
1
-0.284
1

MYA
0.488
0.102
1

Correlation matrix for Yazoo Cotton

Futures price change
Basis
MYA
Farm yield
County yield

Futures price
change
1

Basis
0.609
1
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MYA
0.498
0.142
1

Farm
yield
-0.403
0.188
-0.141
1

County
yield
-0.453
-0.261
-0.233
0.294
1

Table 5.5

Correlation matrix for Yazoo Soybean

Futures price change
Basis
MYA
Farm yield
County yield

Table 5.6

Futures
price
change
1

Basis
-0.490
1

MYA
0.465
-0.366
1

Farm
yield
-0.481
0.194
-0.073
1

County
yield
0.511
-0.353
-0.410
0.340
1

Farm
yield
-0.443
0.070
-0.167
1

County
yield
-0.524
-0.227
-0.312
0.540
1

Correlation matrix for Sheridan Wheat

Futures price change
Basis
MYA
Farm yield
County yield

Futures price
change
Basis
1
-0.181
1

MYA
0.402
0.140
1

Optimal hedge ratios and certainty equivalent gains with no insurance programs
The study confirms earlier findings of Coble et al. (2000) that the optimal hedge
ratios and the certainty equivalent gains are positive when farmers use only hedging
without any farm program or other insurance. Expected utility response to varying hedge
ratios was used to determine the optimal hedge ratio. The hedge ratio was changed in 1
percent increments until the maximum expected utility was reached. Certainty equivalent
was calculated as hedge ratio ran from 0 percent to 100 percent and the chosen certainty
equivalent was the one that has the optimal hedge ratio.
Table 5.7 reports the optimal hedge ratios and their corresponding certainty
equivalent gains when only hedging is used. As has been stated, the risk preference of
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farmers is the important element for the insurance decision. Risk averters are the main
objects in this thesis so that different levels of risk aversions are fully evaluated. As has
been already stated, constant relative risk aversion assumptions are employed in this
study. The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of 2 is assigned as a moderate risk
aversion, CRRA of 3 is assigned as a high risk aversion and CRRA of 4 represents an
extreme risk aversion. Table 5.7 reports the certainty equivalent gains and the
corresponding optimal hedge ratios based on the initial wealth. Clearly, besides the initial
wealth, the different levels in risk preferences would influence the hedging decisions and
the certainty equivalent gains as well.
Having described all the conditions for calculating optimal hedge ratios and
certainty equivalent gains, we now start to explain how these figures reflect farmers’
hedging decision. Start with CRRA of 2, the moderate risk averters in McLean county
have the highest optimal hedge ratios, which are 41% for corn and 39% for soybean.
Sheridan wheat has the second highest optimal hedge ratio, which is 38%. Yazoo county
has the lowest optimal hedge with 36% for cotton and only 30% for soybean. One can
see that with the same soybean crop, the optimal hedge ratios change from 39% in
McLean to only 30% in Yazoo. As a result, farmers in Yazoo county are more
conservative in hedging decisions and those producers use hedging that is more moderate
than those ones in McLean county. This phenomenon can be explained by the evidence
that Yazoo county is riskier than McLean county (table 5.1) so that the volatility of both
crop price and yield in Yazoo is higher than that in McLean. Farmers in Yazoo find it
harder to forecast the future crop price and yield every crop year, thus utilizing a more
conservative hedging choice, which is the low hedging. Sheridan counties’ optimal hedge
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ratio falls in between those of McLean and Yazoo. The reason to explain why higher
risky area results in lower hedge ratio is that farmers have to cope with the yield basis
risk. Higher risky areas such as Yazoo and Sheridan have higher yield volatility, thus
increasing the uncertainty in the expected yield, which is an important element in
deciding the money gain in the futures contract.
As has been stated, certainty equivalent gains from crop hedging are calculated by
simply taking the difference between the certainty equivalent with the hedging existence
and the certainty equivalent without risk protecting instruments. Even though the
certainty equivalent gains depend on the assumptions of initial wealth and risk aversion
coefficients, comparing certainty equivalent gains among different scenarios still can
reflect the benefit or the effect of using the hedging instruments. Certainty equivalent
gains indicate the increased welfare farmers receive from using hedging instrument. The
highest certainty equivalent gains were in McLean which also has the highest optimal
hedge ratios. Once again, the lowest certainty equivalent gains are in Yazoo and Sheridan
counties. Risky regions clearly lower not only the benefits but also the optimal hedge
ratios that farmers can receive from using a hedge.
The results in this chapter follow the economic theory in that the higher the
relative risk aversion coefficient, the higher the optimal hedge ratios would be. According
to economic theory, with the same given condition of risk in crop price and yield and all
else equal, the person who has a higher risk aversion level would choose a higher optimal
hedge ratio to protect him from uncertainty. The findings of optimal hedge ratios are
consistent across different risk level regions. In each region, the optimal hedge ratio
increases as the risk aversion coefficient rises from 2 to 4. The certainty equivalent gains
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from the higher risk aversion levels are also higher than those from the lower risk
aversion levels.
In general, the results show that optimal hedge ratios are relatively low in risky
areas like Yazoo or Sheridan, where the uncertainties in yields are higher than those in
McLean. As the crop yield risk increases, the hedged yield, or in other words, the
expected yield that is signed by farmers in the futures contract would be more uncertain.
Although the price risk is locked in with the futures hedging leaving price risk at zero, the
yield uncertainty is the threat to the farmers’ hedge. For example, in a bad growing
season the producer may not produce the necessary bushels hedged and thus, offset the
futures trade. Conversely if excess crop is produced the futures market booking is too
small leaving the price received on the extra bushels unprotected. The unpredictability in
expected yield would negatively influence farmers’ hedging decision. Hence, the low
probability in producing the expected hedgeable quantity leaves an optimal hedge ratios
that is lower compared to less risky production due to the high yield variability.
According to Coble et al. (2000), the authors stated that optimal hedge ratios move in the
opposite direction with the yield variability and found the results consistent with these
results. Their findings are consistent with the argument of McKinnon (1991) and
Moschini and Lapan (1995). This thesis also found the same results in that optimal hedge
ratios are negatively correlated with the yield variability. Regarding Table 5.1, the CV
represents the variation of farm yields across different regions. While CVs of farm yields
in McLean corn and soybean are 0.23 and 0.24 respectively, CV of farm yield in Yazoo
cotton is 0.4, in Yazoo soybean is 0.42 and in Sheridan wheat is 0.34. Thus, yield
variability in McLean county is less than that of the other regions. As a result, optimal
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hedge ratios in McLean corn and soybean are larger than those in Yazoo and Sheridan
crops. These findings are again consistent with different assumptions of risk preferences
of farmers. As the risk aversion level increases, optimal hedge ratios increase and the
lower risky areas still keep the higher optimal hedge ratios than the other regions do. The
certainty equivalent gains for the higher levels of risk aversion also moderately increase.
Note that the optimal hedge ratios in Tables 5.7 included all the transaction cost of the
futures contract. Interest for the initial margin and maintenance margin is presumed to be
zero for making the calculation easier.
Basis risk also plays a role in optimal hedge ratios chosen by farmers. Basis of
cotton and wheat is higher than that of soybean and corn. Thus, we observe higher
optimal hedge ratios in McLean corn and McLean soybean compared to those ratios in
Yazoo cotton and Sheridan wheat.

52

53
36

30

38

Yazoo, MS
- Soybean

Sheridan, KS
- Wheat

39

McLean, IL
- Soybean

Yazoo, MS
- Cotton

41

McLean, IL
- Corn

Optimal
hedge ratio (%)

0.242

0.5226

0.6404

0.6695

0.9172

CE gain
(million $)

CRRA = 2
Wealth = $1,600,000

48

38

41

45

46

0.2454

0.5242

0.6482

0.6718

1.052

CE gain
(million $)

CRRA = 3
Wealth = $1,600,000
Optimal
hedge ratio (%)

Optimal Hedge Ratios and CE gain without Insurance

Location

Table 5.7

54

47

50

48

53

Optimal
hedge ratio (%)

0.2499

0.5288

0.9918

0.6854

1.0645

CE gain
(million $)

CRRA = 4
Wealth = $1,600,000

Hedging combined with various types of insurance programs are examined and
reported in Table 5.8 to Table 5.12. The influence of these alternative insurance designs
on the futures hedge was calculated for insurance coverage levels changing from 0
percent to 100 percent with the increments of 5 percent. Hedge ratios are calculated as in
the previous reported tables so that the increment for the optimal hedge is 1 percent. In
reality, the current yield or revenue insurance programs are not available for the coverage
levels above 85percent (Coble et al., 2000) but this study examines the effect of area
revenue insurance, which covers the shallow loss, so that the investigation was conducted
to 100 percent to see the full impact of this insurance combined with the hedging on
farmers’ welfare.
The findings reported are for a CRRA risk aversion value of two, which means
the moderate risk aversion coefficient, and transaction cost of futures contract of $0.06
per acre. First, I look at the certainty equivalents in these following tables. McLean corn
and soybean have the higher certainty equivalents compared to other regions’ crops. This
result is not surprising because McLean is less risky than Yazoo and Sheridan. In all
representative areas, at low insurance coverage levels, which are from 5 percent to
around 50 percent, the effect of insurance on optimal hedge ratios is relatively small. For
all alternative insurances, farmers recognized the first change in optimal hedge ratio at 50
percent coverage level in McLean corn. In McLean soybean, RP and RPPE have the first
change at 50 percent leverage, following by APH and GRP, which have the first effect on
the optimal hedge ratio at 60 percent and 70 percent coverage levels, respectively. In
Yazoo and Sheridan, which the first change on optimal hedge ratios comes sooner than
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that in McLean, the optimal hedge ratios are influenced by insurance at around 35 percent
to 45 percent.

55

56

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

41

10

20

41

5

15

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

($)

CE

No Insurance

84

83

82

81

78

73

65

56

49

44

42

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

3115150.1

3028288.9

2938697.0

2848352.0

2759475.6

2677511.7

2610047.8

2562570.2

2535592.7

2522326.7

2518050.8

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

APH

64

61

57

54

51

48

45

43

42

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

3159461.1

3074282.9

2985996.2

2896703.6

2804099.4

2712342.2

2631123.2

2571622.6

2537846.3

2523161.0

2518689.1

2517756.0

2517433.9

2517254.0

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

RP

16

15

15

14

14

16

20

27

34

38

40

40

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

3145280.4

3059462.0

2970937.1

2881702.0

2790938.2

2703489.1

2627220.0

2571151.1

2537322.8

2523221.5

2519222.4

2517935.0

2517547.0

2517291.5

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

RPPE

57

52

48

44

42

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

41

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

Optimal hedge ratios and Certainty equivalent with insurance in McLean Corn

(%)

level

Coverage

Table 5.8

($)

CE

2526736.2

2517338.3

2513727.7

2513798.5

2515095.2

2516193.1

2516854.0

2517204.9

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

2517247.6

GRP

57

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

39

30

39

39

25

45

39

20

39

39

15

39

39

10

40

39

5

35

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

($)

CE

No Insurance

47

47

47

46

45

43

41

40

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2349853.8

2330110.8

2308092.9

2300969.7

2292400.3

2281434.9

2273768.3

2271767.7

2278979.6

2284105.8

2289184.8

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

APH

18

16

14

13

13

15

19

25

31

35

37

38

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2343659.7

2325321.8

2305458.1

2303801.7

2301674.6

2293795.3

2285869.8

2280391.3

2283407.5

2285351.8

2289126.1

2296723.3

2296311.6

2296130.8

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

RP

1

1

1

1

1

1

10

19

27

33

36

38

38

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2350096.8

2332184.0

2314839.0

2315399.6

2315817.6

2309225.1

2300446.1

2292033.6

2290541.3

2289377.1

2291028.9

2297102.9

2296457.9

2296178.2

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

RPPE

44

43

41

40

40

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

39

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

Optimal hedge ratios and Certainty equivalent with insurance in McLean Soybean

(%)

level

Coverage

Table 5.9

($)

CE

2088879.6

2107083.8

2130006.9

2172662.9

2212064.3

2238918.7

2256521.0

2267071.5

2278151.5

2284083.0

2289184.8

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

2296127.3

GRP

58

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

36

30

36

36

25

45

36

20

36

36

15

36

36

10

40

36

5

35

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

($)

CE

No Insurance

(%)

level

Coverage

47

47

47

45

43

41

40

39

38

37

37

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2270668.1

2255076.2

2242738.8

2245288.5

2248933.5

2248261.4

2246315.0

2243552.7

2244767.3

2244941.1

2246805.7

2250852.5

2250546.2

2250402.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

APH

1

1

1

1

3

8

14

19

24

29

31

33

34

35

35

36

36

36

36

36

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2291686.3

2277179.7

2263811.8

2267548.5

2271290.0

2268188.8

2261657.4

2253900.0

2251220.7

2247343.9

2246889.7

2253101.5

2251670.1

2251085.9

2250804.1

2250536.7

2250416.2

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

RP

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

12

19

25

29

32

34

35

35

35

36

36

36

36

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2333701.9

2315748.9

2298591.8

2296734.6

2295006.1

2286946.1

2276156.7

2264481.2

2258744.1

2252214.2

2249655.1

2254048.2

2252118.3

2251217.3

2250885.7

2250608.3

2250435.6

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

RPPE

Table 5.10 Optimal hedge ratios and Certainty equivalent with insurance in Yazoo Cotton

37

40

42

42

41

41

40

40

38

38

37

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2389320.7

2358333.6

2328544.8

2314546.9

2302859.5

2288359.8

2273715.2

2261419.0

2255723.7

2251099.6

2249415.9

2251946.7

2250828.9

2250521.5

2250371.5

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

2250362.3

GRP

59

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

30

30

30

30

25

45

30

20

30

30

15

30

30

10

40

30

5

35

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

($)

CE

No Insurance

(%)

level

Coverage

43

43

42

41

39

37

35

32

31

31

31

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2219626.2

2192345.6

2164983.6

2148741.8

2135366.5

2121510.9

2110851.7

2104186.2

2106429.7

2109178.8

2113081.1

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

APH

13

11

9

9

10

11

14

18

23

27

29

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2206147.4

2182364.2

2158230.0

2147306.0

2138181.8

2126418.9

2115744.8

2107384.0

2107964.3

2108424.4

2111458.4

2122885.7

2122675.4

2122573.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

RP

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

12

20

25

28

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

2216808.3

2193357.9

2170469.3

2159484.2

2150127.4

2138118.8

2126944.2

2117116.1

2114687.0

2112746.6

2113860.4

2123070.0

2122756.0

2122603.5

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

RPPE

39

37

35

33

32

31

31

31

31

31

31

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

Table 5.11 Optimal hedge ratios and Certainty equivalent with insurance in Yazoo Soybean

($)

CE

2045986.9

2042116.2

2042340.1

2055778.0

2071755.1

2084171.4

2093292.8

2098578.5

2105614.4

2109174.2

2113081.1

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

2122565.6

GRP

60

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

38

30

38

38

25

45

38

20

38

38

15

38

38

10

40

38

5

35

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

($)

CE

No Insurance

(%)

level

Coverage

74

74

73

72

70

67

64

60

56

51

47

44

41

40

38

38

38

38

38

38

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

1909625.7

1893485.2

1877528.0

1875750.1

1875700.7

1870064.2

1860758.0

1848546.8

1843886.6

1836139.1

1832979.9

1849619.3

1845584.1

1843216.9

1842230.6

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

APH

59

57

54

52

51

49

48

47

45

44

42

41

40

39

38

38

38

38

38

38

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

1915009.4

1899396.8

1883752.6

1882675.4

1882800.1

1876729.6

1866308.9

1852416.2

1846264.2

1837279.1

1833063.6

1850651.2

1845935.9

1843227.3

1842205.1

1842034.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

RP

12

13

14

15

17

20

22

25

29

31

34

36

37

37

38

38

38

38

38

38

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)
($)

CE

1916411.1

1900914.3

1885462.5

1883759.7

1883276.3

1876779.0

1866285.4

1852358.8

1845815.3

1836922.4

1833298.3

1849841.7

1845266.4

1842874.0

1842180.9

1842044.5

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

RPPE

59

56

53

51

48

46

44

42

41

40

39

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

38

Optimal
hedge
ratios
(%)

Table 5.12 Optimal hedge ratios and Certainty equivalent with insurance in Sheridan Wheat

($)

CE

1741156.4

1743025.8

1745579.8

1762476.1

1780763.0

1792626.7

1799719.0

1802371.5

1810484.8

1813518.2

1819061.0

1842175.4

1842035.6

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

1842027.9

GRP

Effects of alternative individual insurance
Having explained the certainty equivalents in representative crops, this thesis now
uses figures to visually describe the effect of alternative insurance programs on optimal
hedge ratios. Thus, the following figures show the full influence of alternative risk
management instruments in combination with hedging on optimal hedge ratios. In all
figures, three lines are used to report the effect of each type of insurance on the optimal
hedge. The solid line is used as the base line, which represents the effect of individual
revenue insurance on optimal hedge ratios. This study mainly focused on the influence of
area revenue insurance combined with other individual insurance, thus the other two
remaining lines are used to report the change of optimal hedge ratios as area insurance
added to the individual insurance. The star line and dash line represent the effect of
STAX and ARC combining with other deep loss insurance on hedging, respectively.
APH is the individual yield insurance and the findings show the compliment
effect of APH to hedging. In all counties with all representative crops, APH increases the
optimal hedge ratio as the coverage levels increase. At the very low coverage level, there
is little change in optimal hedge ratios. As the APH coverage levels increase, we see a
consistent effect on every crop. However, the magnitude of the optimal hedge change is
different across regions. McLean corn and soybean have less uncertainty and yield
variability, thus having the higher optimal hedge ratio than other regions. The reason why
APH is a complement to the hedging is that this insurance provides a protection against
the yield loss. The function of yield protection of APH does not overlap with the price
protection function of the hedging, thus making optimal hedge ratios increase.
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RPPE is the individual revenue insurance without the upside price protection. In
this thesis, the results show that RPPE can be a substitute for hedging. These results are
consistent across regions. As the coverage levels increase, optimal hedge ratios decrease
if RPPE is used for risk protecting. In Yazoo, from 75 percent insurance coverage, RPPE
even decreases optimal hedge ratios to almost 1percent. RP is the individual revenue
insurance that does cover the upside price effect. The effect of this insurance on optimal
hedge ratios is not consistent in different regions. In McLean corn and Sheridan wheat,
RP shows that it is a complement to the hedging. However, in the other regions, RP is a
substitute to the hedging. The argument that RP does not have a consistent effect on
hedging was stated in Coble et al. (2000) and once again this was found in this study.
Although RP has the upside price protection that compensates farmers for a loss at the
higher price in case the crop price drastically goes up at the end of the crop year, the price
protecting part of this revenue insurance can overlap the function of price protection of
futures. Thus, the effect from using RP is not consistent across regions.
RPPE does not cover the upside price effect as RP does so that RPPE decreases
optimal hedge ratios in every region. In a tradition futures contract, farmer have to sell
the futures contract at the beginning of the year then buy it back at the end of the year;
therefore, if the ending price goes up and is higher than the beginning price, farmers have
to pay more money to buy back the futures contract to return to the clearing house. The
upside price protection thus can help farmers protect the loss from the futures contract.
RP has the upside price protection while RPPE does not have that function so that
farmers with the RP insurance are more aggressive in buying futures contract, thus
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occurring in a higher optimal hedge ratio compared to other producers with RPPE
insurance.
GRP is the only area yield insurance evaluated in this study. Unlike APH, GRP
uses county yield to calculate the indemnity and the trigger as well. According to the
results, GRP increases optimal hedge ratios in almost all crops, except the Yazoo cotton.
In Yazoo cotton, at first GRP slowly increases optimal hedge ratios but at 90 percent
coverage level, the optimal hedge ratio is decreased. The increased magnitude of optimal
hedge ratios made by GRP is smaller than that of APH. The reason behind this result is
that GRP has the yield basis risk, which depends on the regional characteristics. APH
does not have yield basis risk because this insurance uses farm yield as the trigger to
calculate the indemnity. Therefore, in regions where the possibility of homogenous soil is
low, yield basis risk would be increased, thus decreasing the correlation of farm yield and
county yield. As a result, the low correlation of farm yield and county yield would make
the county yield insurance less efficient. That is the reason why there is a decrease in
optimal hedge ratios in Yazoo cotton. Certainly, the decrease of GRP is not as dramatic
as those of RP and RPPE because GRP is still a yield insurance which does not overlap
with the price protection function of futures contract.
In general, APH is always associated with an increase in optimal hedge ratios as
insurance leverage increases. With the appearance of yield basis risk, GRP increases
optimal hedge ratios but at a lower level compared to APH. RPPE shows that it is a
substitute to the hedging while the result of RP falls into between of APH and RPPE.
These results of APH, RP and RPPE confirm the findings of Coble et al. (2000). Besides,
the finding that GRP increases optimal hedge ratios is a new discovery of this thesis. This
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finding once again confirms the argument that yield insurance is complement to hedging,
no matter whether the yield insurance is county or farm based design.
Effects of ARC and STAX
Figures 5.1 to 5.20 present the results of ARC and STAX associated with
alternative individual insurance programs. The dash line and the star line represent the
effect of ARC and STAX when they are combined with APH, RP, RPPE and GRP, which
are presented by the solid line in each figure.
In general, the results indicate that ARC and STAX are complement to hedging
when they are combined with either yield insurance or revenue insurance. Nevertheless,
ARC covers a narrower layer of revenue risk than does STAX in that the increase in
optimal hedge ratios made by the combination of ARC and alternative individual
insurance is smaller than that of STAX combinations.
STAX in practice is applied to only cotton planting farm; however, this thesis
evaluated STAX on the optimal hedge ratios for other crops to have a full examination,
thus making more comparable in evaluating STAX among different counties. McLean
corn has the highest increase in optimal hedge ratios as the individual insurance is
associated with ARC or STAX. For all types of individual insurance, the combination of
them with ARC increases the optimal hedge ratio by approximately 8 percent while
individual insurance combined with STAX makes the hedge ratio go up to 12 percent.
McLean soybean and Sheridan wheat has the lower increase in optimal hedge ratios
compared to McLean corn in that the optimal hedge ratio increases by only 5 percent for
ARC and 8 percent for STAX at almost all coverage levels. The lowest increase in
optimal hedge ratios was recognized in Yazoo county with only 3 percent for ARC and 5
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percent for STAX. The findings are reasonable and follow the economic theories in that
in a county of low yield risk, the area revenue insurance supports farmers better
compared to other regions. McLean county has a higher correlation between farm and
county yields than the other planting areas so that those crops in that county have more
benefits from ARC and STAX, thus having the higher optimal hedge ratios.
Yazoo county is the riskiest planting region, which has high yield variability and
lowest correlation between farm and county yields, has the lowest optimal hedge ratio
increase as the coverage levels increase.
Further interesting investigations are explored in this study. As have already been
explained, ARC and STAX are complement to the hedging in that they shift the base line
to the higher hedge ratio. However, the shifting is parallel from zero to around 60 percent
insurance coverage but as the coverage levels increase from 60 percent to 100 percent,
the magnitude of the higher optimal hedge ratio gradually decreased. This phenomenon
appears in every county so that this result is consistent. To explain this finding one needs
to understand that ARC and STAX are area revenue insurance. The function of these
types of insurance is to cover the shallow loss, which is the loss incurred to farmers at the
coverage level above 75 percent. Hence, the area revenue insurance is designed to protect
the risk for coverage levels from 75 percent and up. At first, the association of individual
insurance designs with area revenue insurance works best for coverage levels that are
under 60 percent. From the 60 percent insurance coverage level and up, the optimal
hedge ratio increases at a decreasing rate indicates that the use of a mix of area revenue
insurance, deep loss insurance and futures contract is abundant.
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Figure 5.1

Optimal hedge ratios for APH in McLean Corn
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Figure 5.2

Optimal hedge ratios for GRP in McLean Corn
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Figure 5.3

Optimal hedge ratios for RP in McLean Corn
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Figure 5.4

Optimal hedge ratios for RPPE in McLean Corn

69

Figure 5.5

Optimal hedge ratios for APH in McLean Soybean
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Figure 5.6

Optimal hedge ratios for GRP in McLean Soybean
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Figure 5.7

Optimal hedge ratios for RP in McLean Soybean
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Figure 5.8

Optimal hedge ratios for RPPE in McLean Soybean
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Figure 5.9

Optimal hedge ratios for APH in Sheridan Wheat
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Figure 5.10

Optimal hedge ratios for GRP in Sheridan Wheat
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Figure 5.11

Optimal hedge ratios for RP in Sheridan Wheat
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Figure 5.12

Optimal hedge ratios for RPPE in Sheridan Wheat
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Figure 5.13

Optimal hedge ratios for APH in Yazoo Cotton
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Figure 5.14

Optimal hedge ratios for GRP in Yazoo Cotton
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Figure 5.15

Optimal hedge ratios for RP in Yazoo Cotton
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Figure 5.16

Optimal hedge ratios for RPPE in Yazoo Cotton
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Figure 5.17

Optimal hedge ratios for APH in Yazoo Soybean
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Figure 5.18

Optimal hedge ratios for GRP in Yazoo Soybean
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Figure 5.19

Optimal hedge ratios for RP in Yazoo Soybean
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Figure 5.20

Optimal hedge ratios for RPPE in Yazoo Soybean
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

There have been numerous crop insurance programs whose goals are to provide
farmers with risk protecting instruments against the agricultural uncertainties. Empirical
analysis was conducted to bring an overview to the effect of a new type of area revenue
insurance associated with hedging. Therefore, the findings can be employed by both
government policy makers and farmers in supporting risk management decisions. County
based yield insurance has been first evaluated. Moreover, the study also reviews the
effect of other individual insurance on optimal hedge ratios.
First of all, the main contribution of this thesis to the literature is that it provides
the first investigation of area revenue insurance effect on optimal hedging. Results prove
that ARC and STAX are moderate complements to hedging in that they increase the
optimal hedge ratios as the insurance coverage increases. ARC provides a lower risk
protecting layer than does STAX due to a lower increase in optimal hedge ratios.
Producers in riskier planting regions, which have higher yield variability and low
correlation of farm yield and county yield, show that they have lower hedging decisions,
in other words, they take less risk than farmers in other regions which have less
agricultural uncertainties. ARC and STAX are also affected by regional differences in
that they support the hedging better in less risky areas.
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Secondly, the research contributes a new finding of county yield insurance effect
on the futures market. County yield insurance, which is GRP in this study, indicates that
it is complement to the hedging at a lower level compared to APH. Yield basis risk is the
element that results in the different effect of GRP and APH. Like other insurance,
regional difference also influence the hedging decision of producers. The riskier the
region is, the less optimal hedge ratios are. Other results of individual yield insurance and
revenue insurance confirm previous study of Coble et al. (2000). While individual yield
insurance, (APH), is a complement to the hedging, revenue insurance tends to be a
substitute for the hedging. Although RP has the upside price protection, its optimal hedge
ratio falls in between that of APH and RPPE.
This study showed that with a given condition of risk, a higher risk averse
individual would decide to have a higher optimal hedge ratio compared to others that are
willing to take more risk. This finding follows the economic theory in that, with the same
given condition of risk in crop price and crop yield and all else equal, the person who is
more risk averse would choose a higher hedge ratio to protect him from uncertainty. The
result is consistent in different risky planting areas.
Obviously, extensions can be made to this study. The study examined the effect of
insurance associated with the futures in only three regions and four crops. Thus, future
works related to this topic can be used in other crops and regions to confirm the findings
of this thesis. Moreover, other simulation methods can be applied to the data processing
so that the new results can be compared to this study. This study evaluated only ARC and
STAX, the area revenue insurance programs that were proposed in 2012. Future research
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can examine new Farm Bill insurance programs in 2013 that use actual farm program
parameters adopted in legislation to upgrade and confirm these findings.
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APPENDIX A
CODE
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%%%% code of thesis %%%%
function [end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld,i_futc,fut_mn] =
full_opt_hedg(regions,crop,beg,beg_y,cost,floan,n,s,y0c,method)
%clear all;
close all;
clc;
% Input data: correlation matrix (depends on which PQH or Copula is used, this
matrix differs)
% McLean (Illinois): corn and soybean,Yazoo (Mississippi): cotton and soybean,
Sheridan (Kansas): wheat
% cor=corn, soy=soybean, cotn=cotton, whet=wheat
% soy_mya,cor_mya,whet_mya,cotn_mya: marketing year average price of crop
% soy_futc,cor_futc,whet_futc,cotn_futc: name of crop futures price change
% soy_fyld,cor_fyld,whet_fyld,cotn_fyld: name of crop farm yield
% soy_cyld,cor_cyld,whet_cyld,cotn_cyld: name of crop county yield
% soy_bas,cor_bas,whet_bas,cotn_bas: name of crop basis
% basis=cash price (spot price) - futures price
% harvest time futures price = beginning futures price + futures price change
% beg_cor, beg_cotn, beg_soy, beg_whet: arbitrary futures price
%%%%%%%---Correlation matrix preparation---%%%%%%%%
filename =[regions '.' crop];
disp(['Loading ' filename '...']);
load([filename '.mat']);
%set beginning futures price as the arbitrary futures price
% beg_cor = 7.5;
% beg_cotn = 0.72;
% beg_soy = 15;
% beg_whet = 8.5;
%%set transaction cost of futures contract (no margin interest included)
%cost_fut = 0.06;
%set cost of crops per acre
% cost_cor = 39.6;
% cost_cotn = 467.54;
% cost_soy = 138.84;
% cost_whet = 121.56;
%%set beginning farm yield
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% beg_ysoy_MI = 75.4;
% beg_ycor_MI = 162;
% beg_ysoy_YM = 58;
% beg_ycotn_YM = 1353;
% beg_ywhet_SK = 55;
%%set loan rate
% floan_cor = 1.95;
% floan_soy = 5.00;
% floan_cotn = 0.52;
% floan_whet = 2.94;
%%%%%%%%%%---Naming data---%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Here is for matrix size of 5. Adjust in case the matrix size is changed
futc=data(:,1);
bas=data(:,2);
mya=data(:,3);
fyld=data(:,4);
cyld=data(:,5);
%futc = futc*beg;
mya = mya*beg;
%Calculate mean and std of prices
[fut_mn,bas_mn,mya_mn] = calc_mean_std(data(:,1:3),'price-mean'); % mean of
prices
[fut_sd,bas_sd,mya_sd] = calc_mean_std(data(:,1:3),'price-std'); %std of prices
%Calculate mean and std of yields
[fyld_mn,cyld_mn] = calc_mean_std(data(:,4:end),'yield-mean'); %mean of yields
[fyld_sd,cyld_sd] = calc_mean_std(data(:,4:end),'yield-std'); %std of yields
[fyld_min,cyld_min] = calc_mean_std(data(:,4:end),'yield-min'); %min of yields
to calculate upper and lower bounds
[fyld_max,cyld_max] = calc_mean_std(data(:,4:end),'yield-max');%max of yields
to calculate upper and lower bounds
%Establishing upper and lower bounds for yield distribution (beta
%distribution)
%Upper bounds
ub_fyld = fyld_max*1.1;
ub_cyld = cyld_max*1.1;
%Lower bounds
94

lb_fyld =fyld_min*0.9;
lb_cyld = cyld_min*0.9;
%Calibrate (rearrange) data into lower-upper bound range
fyld1 = (fyld-lb_fyld)/(ub_fyld-lb_fyld);
cyld1 = (cyld-lb_cyld)/(ub_cyld-lb_cyld);
%mean of yield for calibrating data
fyld1_mn = mean(fyld1);
cyld1_mn = mean(cyld1);
%variance of yield for calibrating data
fyld1_var = var(fyld1);
cyld1_var = var(cyld1);
%Calculate parameters a and b for beta distribution imposed on yields
a_fyld = fyld1_mn*((fyld1_mn*(1-fyld1_mn)/fyld1_var)-1);
b_fyld = (1-fyld1_mn)*((fyld1_mn*(1-fyld1_mn)/fyld1_var)-1);
a_cyld = cyld1_mn*((cyld1_mn*(1-cyld1_mn)/cyld1_var)-1);
b_cyld = (1-cyld1_mn)*((cyld1_mn*(1-cyld1_mn)/cyld1_var)-1);
%%%%%%%----Simulation-----%%%%%%%
% n=1000;%number of simulated samples
disp([num2str(n) ' points simulation...']);
M=size(data,2);% size statement specifies the dimension of array which 1 is row,
2 is column.
% method='PQH';
% method='copula';
switch method
case 'PQH'
if exist('corr')
clear corr;
end
[corr_mat,pval]=corr(data,'Type','Spearman');
p=simulate_multivariate(corr_mat,n,method,s);
case 'copula'
p=copula_multivariate(data,n);%Copula function for creating simulated
variables following Copula types: Gaussian, Kendall, Student...
end
%Output of p-function - Simulated outcomes follow uniform distribution (0,1)
%Out put of prices
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p_futc = p(:,1);%p_futc: outcome of futures price change
p_bas = p(:,2);
p_mya = p(:,3);
%Output of yields
p_fyld = p(:,4);
p_cyld = p(:,5);
p_const = zeros(n,1);%create a constant vector of 0 to compare in Inversion step
%%%Inversion step
disp('Inversion step...');
%%Inversion of uniform cdf of prices (Inverse of lognormal distribution)
%ennding futures prices
inv_futc = icdf('Normal',p_futc,0,1);%output of inversion step of crop futures
price change
i_futc = ((inv_futc*fut_sd)+fut_mn);
%end_futc = max(p_const,(i_futc + beg));%ending futures price of soybean: f1
end_futc = max(p_const, (i_futc*beg));%ending futures price in terms of relative
ratio
%Basis and cash prices
inv_bas = icdf('Normal',p_bas,0,1);
end_bas = ((inv_bas+bas_sd)+bas_mn);
end_cs = max(p_const,(end_futc + end_bas));%ending cash price of soybean(spot
price): p1
%MYA
inv_mya = icdf('Normal',p_mya,0,1);
i_mya = ((inv_mya+mya_sd)+mya_mn);
end_mya = max(p_const,i_mya);%ending MYA of soybean : fMYA
%%Inversion of uniform cdf of Yields(Inverse of Beta distribution)
%Farm yields
end_fyld = (icdf('Beta',p_fyld,a_fyld,b_fyld)*(ub_fyld-lb_fyld))+lb_fyld;%y1
%County yields
end_cyld = (icdf('Beta',p_cyld,a_cyld,b_cyld)*(ub_cyld-lb_cyld))+lb_cyld;%y1c
%Optimal hedge ratio calculation
W0=1600000;%initial wealth
%calcRepresentativeIndemity(filename,beg,beg_y,end_futc,end_fyld,end_cyld);
%to compute the Indemnity
load([filename '.premium.mat']);
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CE_1=calcCE(1,cost,beg,beg_y,end_futc,end_fyld,end_cs,end_cyld,end_mya,flo
an,W0,Raph,Rstax,Rrppe,Rrp,y0c);%r=1
CE_2=calcCE(2,cost,beg,beg_y,end_futc,end_fyld,end_cs,end_cyld,end_mya,flo
an,W0,Raph,Rstax,Rrppe,Rrp,y0c);%r=2
CE_3=calcCE(3,cost,beg,beg_y,end_futc,end_fyld,end_cs,end_cyld,end_mya,flo
an,W0,Raph,Rstax,Rrppe,Rrp,y0c);%r=3
CE_4=calcCE(4,cost,beg,beg_y,end_futc,end_fyld,end_cs,end_cyld,end_mya,flo
an,W0,Raph,Rstax,Rrppe,Rrp,y0c);%r=4
save(['./results/' method '/' filename '.CEandOptHedgeRatio.' num2str(s)
'.mat'],'CE_1','CE_2','CE_3','CE_4');
%%%%---Calculate certainty equivalent for each crop---For research paper%%%
function
CE=calcCE(r,C,f0,y0,f1,y1,p1,y1c,fMYA,floan,W0,Raph,Rstax,Rrppe,Rrp,y0c)
maxHf=140;
%NI of market return(1)
NIc=calcMarketReturn(p1,y1,C);
%NI of ARC(6)
NIarc=calcARC(y1c,fMYA,floan);
%NI of STAX(7)
subsidy=0.8;
NIstax=calcSTAX(f0,f1,y1c,subsidy,Rstax);
%NI of futures contract(5)
hf=0.01*(1:1:maxHf);%1% increment
for i=1:length(hf)
NIf(:,i)=calcFutures(hf(i),y0,f0,f1);
end
% maxHf=length(hf);
%%%%% Main program: mixed insurance and futures %%%%
%%%Calculate Net returns (NI)
CL=0.05:0.05:1;
subsidy_all=[ones(1,9) 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.48 0.38 0.3 0.3 0.3];
%Option 1: NI-ARC
NI_ARC=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+NIf+repmat(NIarc,1,maxHf);
[CE_ARC,opt_ARC]=calcOptHf(NI_ARC,r,W0);
%Option 2: NI-STAX
NI_STAX=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+NIf+repmat(NIstax,1,maxHf);
[CE_STAX,opt_STAX]=calcOptHf(NI_STAX,r,W0);
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%Calculate NI for farm based insurances and their combinations with county
based insurance
for i=1:length(CL)
subsidy=subsidy_all(i);
NIaph=calcAPH(f0,y0,CL(i),y1,subsidy,Raph(i));
NIrppe=calcRPPE(f0,y0,f1,y1,CL(i),subsidy,Rrppe(i));
NIrp=calcRP(f0,y0,f1,y1,CL(i),subsidy,Rrp(i));
NIgrp=calcGRP(f0,y0c,CL(i),y1c,subsidy,Raph(i));
%Option 3: NI-APH
NI_APH=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIaph,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_APH(i),opt_APH(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_APH,r,W0);
%Option 4: NI-RP
NI_RP=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_RP(i),opt_RP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_RP,r,W0);
%Option 5: NI-RPPE
NI_RPPE=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrppe,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_RPPE(i),opt_RPPE(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_RPPE,r,W0);
%Option 6: NI-ARC-APH
NI_ARC_APH
=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIarc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIaph,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_ARC_APH(i),opt_ARC_APH(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_ARC_APH,r,W0);
%Option 7: NI-ARC-RP
NI_ARC_RP =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIarc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_ARC_RP(i),opt_ARC_RP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_ARC_RP,r,W0);
%Option 8: NI-ARC-RPPE
NI_ARC_RPPE =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIarc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrppe,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_ARC_RPPE(i),opt_ARC_RPPE(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_ARC_RPPE,r,W0);
%Option 9: NI-STAX-APH
NI_STAX_APH =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIstax,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIaph,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_STAX_APH(i),opt_STAX_APH(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_STAX_APH,r,W0);
%Option 10: NI-STAX-RP
NI_STAX_RP =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIstax,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_STAX_RP(i),opt_STAX_RP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_STAX_RP,r,W0);
%Option 11: NI-STAX-RPPE
NI_STAX_RPPE =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIstax,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIrppe,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_STAX_RPPE(i),opt_STAX_RPPE(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_STAX_RPPE,r,W0);
%Option 12: NI-GRP
NI_GRP = repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIgrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
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[CE_GRP(i),opt_GRP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_GRP,r,W0);
NI_ARC_GRP =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIarc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIgrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_ARC_GRP(i),opt_ARC_GRP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_ARC_GRP,r,W0);
NI_STAX_GRP =
repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIstax,1,maxHf)+repmat(NIgrp,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_STAX_GRP(i),opt_STAX_GRP(i)]=calcOptHf(NI_STAX_GRP,r,W0);
end
%Option 12: NI-Futures
NI_Future=repmat(NIc,1,maxHf)+NIf;
[CE_Future,opt_Future]=calcOptHf(NI_Future,r,W0);
%Output the results
%Option 1: NI-ARC (1+5+6)CE_ARC,opt_ARC
CE{1}.CE=CE_ARC;
CE{1}.opt=opt_ARC;
CE{1}.name='CE-ARC';
%Option 2: NI-STAX (1 +5+7)CE_STAX,opt_STAX
CE{2}.CE=CE_STAX;
CE{2}.opt=opt_STAX;
CE{2}.name='CE-STAX';
%Option 3: NI-APH
CE{3}.CE=CE_APH;
CE{3}.opt=opt_APH;
CE{3}.name='CE-APH';
%Option 4: NI-RP
CE{4}.CE=CE_RP;
CE{4}.opt=opt_RP;
CE{4}.name='CE-RP';
%Option 5: NI-RPPE
CE{5}.CE=CE_RPPE;
CE{5}.opt=opt_RPPE;
CE{5}.name='CE-RPPE';
%Option 6: NI-ARC-APH
CE{6}.CE=CE_ARC_APH;
CE{6}.opt=opt_ARC_APH;
CE{6}.name='CE-ARC-APH';
%Option 7: NI-ARC-RP
CE{7}.CE=CE_ARC_RP;
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CE{7}.opt=opt_ARC_RP;
CE{7}.name='CE-ARC-RP';
%Option 8: NI-ARC-RPPE
CE{8}.CE=CE_ARC_RPPE;
CE{8}.opt=opt_ARC_RPPE;
CE{8}.name='CE-ARC-RPPE';
%Option 9: NI-STAX-APH
CE{9}.CE=CE_STAX_APH;
CE{9}.opt=opt_STAX_APH;
CE{9}.name='CE-STAX-APH';
%Option 10: NI-STAX-RP
CE{10}.CE=CE_STAX_RP;
CE{10}.opt=opt_STAX_RP;
CE{10}.name='CE-STAX-RP';
%Option 11: NI-STAX-RPPE
CE{11}.CE = CE_STAX_RPPE;
CE{11}.opt=opt_STAX_RPPE;
CE{11}.name='CE-STAX-RPPE';
%Option 12: NI-Future
CE{12}.CE=CE_Future;
CE{12}.opt=opt_Future;
CE{12}.name='CE-Futures';
%Option 13: NI-GRP
CE{13}.CE=CE_GRP;
CE{13}.opt=opt_GRP;
CE{13}.name='CE-GRP';
%Option 14: NI-ARC-GRP
CE{14}.CE=CE_ARC_GRP;
CE{14}.opt=opt_ARC_GRP;
CE{14}.name='CE-ARC-GRP';
%Option 15: NI-STAX-GRP
CE{15}.CE=CE_STAX_GRP;
CE{15}.opt=opt_STAX_GRP;
CE{15}.name='CE-STAX-GRP';
%%%Function to calculate correspond CE and optimal hedge ratio from Net
returns
function [CEopt,optH]=calcOptHf(NI,r,W0)
W=NI*1000+W0;
if r==1
EU=calcEUfromEV(W,r);
CE=exp(EU);
[EUopt,optH]=max(CE);
CEopt=CE(optH);
else
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EU=calcEUfromEV(W,r);
CE=(EU*(1-r)).^(1/(1-r));
[EUopt,optH]=max(CE);
CEopt=CE(optH);
end
%Function to calculate EU from EV
function EU=calcEUfromEV(W,r)
if r==1
UW=log(W);
else
UW=(W.^(1-r))./(1-r);
end
EU=mean(UW);
%Net return of Market return
function NIc=calcMarketReturn(p1,y1,C)
NIc=p1.*y1-C;
%Net return of APH insurance
function NIaph=calcAPH(f0,y0,CL,y1,subsidy,Raph)
temp=f0*max(CL*y0-y1,0);
NIaph=temp-Raph*(1-subsidy);
%Net return of GRP insurance
function NIgrp=calcGRP(f0,y0c,CL,y1c,subsidy,Raph)
temp=f0*max(CL*y0c-y1c,0);
NIgrp=temp-Raph*(1-subsidy);
%Net return of RPPE insurance
function NIrppe=calcRPPE(f0,y0,f1,y1,CL,subsidy,Rrppe)
temp=max(CL*f0*y0-f1.*y1,0);
NIrppe=temp-Rrppe*(1-subsidy);
%Net return of RP insurance
function NIrp=calcRP(f0,y0,f1,y1,CL,subsidy,Rrp)
temp=max(0.95*CL*max(f0,f1)*y0-f1.*y1,0);
NIrp=temp-Rrp*(1-subsidy);
%Net return of futures contract
function NIf=calcFutures(hf,y0,f0,f1)
NIf=hf*y0*(f0-f1-0.06);
%Create 5 years Olympic average of conty yield
function yOAc=create5yOA(y1c)
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L=length(y1c);
lag1=zeros(L,1);lag2=zeros(L,1);%create L rows and 1 column of 0
lag3=zeros(L,1);lag4=zeros(L,1);
lag5=zeros(L,1);
lag1(2:end)=y1c(1:end-1);%arrange the lagged value
lag2(3:end)=y1c(1:end-2);
lag3(4:end)=y1c(1:end-3);
lag4(5:end)=y1c(1:end-4);
lag5(6:end)=y1c(1:end-5);
yOAc=(sum([lag1,lag2,lag3,lag4,lag5],2)-max([lag1,lag2,lag3,lag4,lag5],[],2)min([lag1,lag2,lag3,lag4,lag5],[],2))/3;%sum, max, min by rows
%Net return of ARC insurance
function NIarc=calcARC(y1c,fMYA,floan)
yOAc=create5yOA(y1c);
REVbc=yOAc.*max(fMYA,floan);
REVgc=0.89*REVbc;
REVc=y1c.*max(fMYA,floan);
dummy=real(REVc<REVgc);%logical value yields 0 or 1 only. To use the logical
value, use command real(x<y)
NIarc=0.75*dummy.*(min(0.1*REVbc,REVgc-REVc));
%Net return of STAX insurance
function NIstax=calcSTAX(f0,f1,y1c,subsidy,Rstax)
yOAc=create5yOA(y1c);
GuarSTAX=0.9*yOAc.*max(f0,f1);
temp=max(0,min(0.2*GuarSTAX,GuarSTAX-y1c.*f1));
NIstax=1.2*(temp-Rstax*(1-subsidy));
close all;clear all;clc;
%%%%This is the program to run all functions: calcCE and
full_opt_hedge%%%%
%set beginning futures price as the arbitrary futures price
% beg_cor = 7.5;
% beg_cotn = 0.72;
% beg_soy = 15;
% beg_whet = 8.5;
%%set transaction cost of futures contract (no margin interest included)
%cost_fut = 0.1;
%set cost of crops per acre: C
% cost_cor = 278.08;
102

% cost_cotn = 345;
% cost_soy = 138.84;
% cost_whet = 121.56;
%%set beginning farm yield: beg_y (y0)
% beg_ysoy_MI = 75.4;
% beg_ycor_MI = 164;
% beg_ysoy_YM = 58;
% beg_ycotn_YM = 1353;
% beg_ywhet_SK = 65;
%%set loan rate: floan
% floan_cor = 1.95;
% floan_soy = 5.00;
% floan_cotn = 0.52;
% floan_whet = 2.94;
%full_opt_hedg(regions,crop,beg,beg_y,cost,floan,n,s,beg_yc)
method = 'PQH';
% method = 'copula';
[end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld]=full_opt_hedg('McLean','corn',7.5,164,278.08,1.95,1
00000,9,174,method);%264,2_464,9
%[end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld,i_futc,fut_mn]=full_opt_hedg('McLean','soy',15,75.4
,138.84,5,100000,2,64,method);%2
%[end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld]=full_opt_hedg('Yazoo','cotn',0.72,1353,345,0.52,10
00,1,100000,method);%1
%[end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld]=full_opt_hedg('Yazoo','soy',15,58,138.84,5,100000
,50,68,method);%2
%[end_cs,end_futc,end_fyld]=full_opt_hedg('Sheridan','wheat',8.5,65,121.56,2.94
,1000,2,43,method);2
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